PDF of Two Chapters on Quaker Mediation in War – Biafra/Nigeria & Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

This PDF consists of two chapters that feature Quaker mediation in conflict situations from an out-of-print, but deeply important book, ***Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft***, edited by Douglas Johnston & Cynthia Sampson, Oxford University Press, 1994, with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. When I was a student in the mid-1970s I met Adam Curle, the Quaker who was the first professor of Peace Studies at Bradford University. He features in the first chapter here, and he left an impression on me. Let's just say that I've bothered to scan these pages to honour and continue his work. A shortened web link to this file is: https://bit.ly/Quaker-war-mediation. My own writings on nonviolence are at: https://www.alastairmcintosh.com/contents-3-nonviolence.htm

1. **"To Make Real the Bond Between Us All": Quaker Conciliation During the Nigerian Civil War**, by Cynthia Sampson, pp. 88 – 118.
2. **Transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: The Role of Religious Actors,** by Ron Kraybill, pp. 208 – 257, (Quaker pages pp. 233 – 244).



Praise for:

Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft

"This book brings a refreshing change....The editors' concluding comments try not to overstate the positive role of religion, but the book brings badly needed balance into the discussion of religion and international affairs."

Foreign Affairs

"Religion and the passion it generates are a major aspect of our humanity, hence a major force not only in the lives of individuals but in the fate of nations. As the various authors of this edifying book keep reminding us, the aphorism that we don't live by bread alone has enormous political and strategic implications."

Washington Post Book World

"While religious differences often stimulate or worsen confrontation, paradoxically the spiritual commonalities deep within all faiths promise a way to reconciliation. This book should serve to promote inter-religious understanding and add to the tools that diplomacy can employ for peace."

Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
Secretary General, United Nations

Religion plays a crucial role in many international conflicts, yet, for the most part, diplomacy either ignores or misunderstands the positive aspects of that role. This unified collection of case studies and theoretical pieces attempts to restore this missing dimension to its rightful place in the conduct of international diplomacy.

About the Editors

Douglas Johnston is the Executive Vice President of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

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Cover Illustration: Raphael, *The Meeting of Pope Leo I and Attila*. Stanze di Raffaello, Vatican Palace, Vatican State. Courtesy Scala/Art Resource, N.Y.

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Johnston Sampson

RELIGION, THE MISSING DIMENSION OF STATECRAFT

FOREWORD BY JIMMY CARTER

RELIGION, THE MISSING DIMENSION OF STATECRAFT

EDITED BY
Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson

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"To Make Real the Bond Between Us All": Quaker Conciliation During the Nigerian Civil War

CYNTHIA SAMPSON

Although independence came peacefully to Nigeria in 1964, the British left a young state that was deeply divided along regional, ethnic, and religious lines. The predominantly Muslim and politically dominant North was outranked economically by the Eastern and Western regions, where Christianity and traditional religions prevailed. A flawed constitution and electoral corruption produced an explosive mix in the First Republic, until two military coups, six months apart, brought the military to power in 1966. With tensions still rising, pogroms against Easterners living in the North sent the survivors fleeing back home. Within months Eastern secessionism reached a fever pitch, and the young nation was plunged into a brutal civil war.

In early January 1970, Adam Curle received a call from Arnold Smith, secretary-general of the British Commonwealth. The Nigerian civil war was abruptly ending. Would the Quaker conciliator return quickly to Nigeria to try to secure a final-hour agreement that might prevent the feared bloodbath?

Nigeria had been locked in bitter warfare for 30 months, since May 30, 1967, when its breakaway Eastern Region declared itself the independent Republic of Biafra (Figure 6.1). In the course of the long war, the federal army had closed in on Biafra from all sides, taking the areas occupied by many small ethnic groups on the perimeter and recapturing the oil-rich lands of the coastal stretch near Port Harcourt. A succession of Biafran capitals had fallen. What was left of the secessionist region was the heartland of the Ibo people, the largest group in the East. Landlocked, in a state of siege, and with hunger widespread, their situation was desperate.

Finally federal troops succeeded in bisecting the rebel enclave. On January 10, Biafran Head of State General Emeka Ojukwu fled in the company of his top cabinet members. In his last broadcast to a beleaguered people, Ojukwu announced that he was "leaving the country temporarily to continue the search for peace." Two days later, the Biafran commanding officer instructed his troops to lay down their arms.

In a midnight broadcast on January 12, Nigerian Head of State General Yakubu Gowon welcomed back into the fold "our brothers who were deceived and misled



Figure 6.1. Nigeria's Regions and Major Ethnic Groups

into armed rebellion against their fatherland." Proclaiming later that there were "no victors, no vanquished" in the war, Gowon shunned any sort of victory celebration and instead called for three days of prayer. The promised amnesty for all Biafrans was put into effect; within days, many former Biafran civilians and soldiers began returning to their jobs under federal auspices, and Nigeria set off on the path of the "three Rs": reconstruction, reintegration, and reconciliation.

Adam Curle did go to Nigeria during this period, as did another Quaker conciliator, John Volkmar, several weeks later. These were the last of 12 trips made to Nigeria and Biafra by these two men and a third Quaker colleague, Walter Martin, in the course of a war whose immense tragedy took at least half a million lives through fighting and hunger. But instead of finding the widely feared violence and retribution against the defeated Easterners, they found that military discipline on the federal side prevailed, and the fighting had ended. Many of the former adversaries were in the midst of a joyful reunion, and Nigeria was beginning to rebuild in what may have been the most extraordinary post-civil war reconciliation to have occurred in modern history.

The Commonwealth secretary-general's alarmed call at the end of the war was one of many indications that the conflict might not have ended that way, however. It was also telling in other respects: it revealed something about the nature of the

close working relationship that had developed over the course of the war between Secretary-General Smith, an official-level third party, and the Quaker team of nonofficial intermediaries. It also revealed Smith's awareness of the close relationship that the Quaker conciliation team had developed with top leaders on both sides in the conflict, particularly with Nigerian leader Gowon.

GENESIS OF THE CONFLICT

The roots of the conflict[1] in Nigeria could be found in ethnic and religious cleavages in the society reinforced by regional divisions dating from the colonial period. Although Nigeria has some 240 distinct language groups, three groups of approximately equal numbers—the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Ibo—make up roughly two-thirds of the population. Each of these is concentrated in one of the traditional regions, the North, West, and East, respectively. A small fourth region, the Mid-West, was created in 1964 in the culturally mixed area between East and West.

The large, predominantly Muslim, Northern Region dwarfed the other two regions in size, however, with more than three-quarters of Nigeria's territory and more than half of its total population. Thus the North dominated Nigerian politics in the postindependence civilian government. At the same time, the mixed Christian-Muslim-animist Western Region and, especially, the predominantly Christian Eastern Region surpassed the North in education, level of development, and representation in the civil service and upper ranks of the military.

Tensions had been mounting in Nigeria since before the country's independence in 1960. Intensely fought elections plagued with fraud and violence, along with widespread corruption and mismanagement by government officials, culminated in two military coups in 1966. The first was staged on January 15 by seven mid-level officers, six of whom were Ibos, the seventh a Yoruba. Although they were unsuccessful in seizing control of the government, the coup plotters succeeded in wiping out much of the country's political leadership, with assassinations of the Nigerian prime minister (a Northerner), the minister of finance, the premiers of the Northern and Western regions (the premiers of the Eastern and Mid-West regions escaped unharmed), and much of the senior military leadership, including four of the most senior Northern officers and two high-ranking officers from the Western Region. The coup attempt was quelled by another Ibo, Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi—not one of the plotters—who assumed power as head of the federal military government.

Though the new government was initially greeted with some relief and the expectation that the army would restore order and clean up corruption, several moves by the new head of state quickly turned the tide of opinion against him.[2] The coup plotters, though jailed, were never brought to trial. And while Ironsi's cabinet was ethnically mixed, he tended to surround himself with fellow Ibos as his top advisers. In time, many Nigerians, especially in the North, began to view the January coup—because of the ethnic makeup of its Ibo ringleaders and of its non-Ibo victims—as an Ibo attempt to take over the government. These suspicions were compounded by Ironsi's decree in May 1966 abolishing Nigeria's federal structure and making it a unitary state, in the interest, he said, of centralizing the administrative functions formerly divided by region and of reducing tribalism and regionalism. At the same time, he banned political activity for 30 months, giving the impression that the military planned to remain in power longer than previously indicated. Demonstrations in the North against the unification decree turned violent against the Eastern Ibos residing in the region, and hundreds were killed. Also in May, compounding suspicions still further, a round of 12 military promotions saw the advancement of eight Ibos, given that Ibos dominated the middle officer ranks; only one of the 12 was a Northerner.

A countercoup in July led by a coalition of Northern officers took Ironsi's life (many other Ibo officers were also targeted) and installed a young Northern officer, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, as supreme commander. Gowon, who had not been part of the coup and who, because of his military training, firmly believed that soldiers did not belong at the helm of government, accepted the leadership role with some hesitation. He fully expected to return power to a civilian government within a matter of months.[3] Even so, from the beginning, one of the four regional military governors refused to accept his authority. Lt. Col. Emeka Ojukwu of the Eastern Region argued that 12 other officers, including Ojukwu himself, were senior to the new head of state.

Gowon immediately reinstituted the four-region federal structure and convened an ad hoc constitutional convention to make recommendations on an appropriate form of civilian government for Nigeria's future. Before it could complete its work, however, in late September and early October, pogroms broke out against Easterners living in the North (Ibos and various Eastern minorities). Retaliation against Northerners living in the Eastern Region further fed the violence in the North. In all, an estimated 6,000–8,000 Easterners were massacred[4] as the violence spread beyond the Muslim far-North into the ethnically and religiously mixed "Middle Belt" area, and this time army soldiers were deeply involved in the killings.

An estimated 1.5 million Easterners fled the North and other parts of the federation for their home region,[5] while Eastern Military Governor Ojukwu ordered the expulsion of all non-Easterners from his region, saying he could no longer ensure their safety. Already Eastern troops stationed elsewhere in Nigeria had been repatriated to their home region, and Northern troops had been transferred from the East.[6] Ojukwu refused to send the Eastern delegates back to the ad hoc constitutional convention, saying he feared for their safety, and numerous efforts to schedule a meeting of the Supreme Military Council in a location that Ojukwu would consider safe were unsuccessful.

One meeting of the Supreme Military Council, including Gowon and Ojukwu and their deputies, did take place in January 1967, hosted by Ghanaian Head of State General Joseph Ankrah at Aburi, Ghana. Though the meeting produced a set of accords that, among other measures, provided for a much decentralized, confederal form of government for Nigeria's four regions, the confederation was

never fully implemented, as both sides retreated from some of the commitments made at Aburi. A second Aburi meeting was being planned for April 1967 in an attempt to salvage the accords, but a coup attempt against General Ankrah ended his efforts on behalf of the Nigerians.

Nigeria continued what by then seemed an inevitable slide toward civil war. On May 27, 1967, the Eastern Consultative Assembly authorized Ojukwu to declare a sovereign Republic of Biafra "at an early practicable date." That declaration came on May 30.

The first shots in the Nigerian civil war were fired by federal troops on July 6, 1967, initiating a "police action" that was expected to last perhaps three weeks. Not until mid-August, when the Biafran Army invaded the Mid-West Region, pushing to within 135 miles of Lagos, did the federal government declare "total war" against the secessionists. Although by early October the Biafran troops had retreated back across the Niger River into their home territory—and never again threatened areas beyond Biafran boundaries (the Eastern Region)—over the next 27 months the conflict settled into a war of attrition with an estimated 600,000 deaths on the battlefield and from starvation.[7] Despite the persistent efforts of a wide array of official and nonofficial third parties from three continents, it ended with the battlefield defeat of a Biafra so diminished in size and strength that it had long since passed the point of being able to plausibly secure its independence.

QUAKER INVOLVEMENT BEGINS

It was on the strength of Quaker contacts in West Africa and the previous experience of certain key Nigerian and Biafran officials with Quaker programs that the Quaker team gained entry as conciliators into the Nigerian conflict.[8] Quaker involvement in Nigeria had begun shortly before the country's independence in 1960 with the posting there of Paul and Priscilla Blanshard, who served as international affairs representatives for the American Friends Service Committee. Recognizing the internal stresses caused by the rivalry among the three dominant ethnic groups, Paul Blanshard launched a series of international work camps in Nigeria in 1961 to strengthen leadership across ethnic lines.

A second Quaker program, International Dialogues in West Africa, was established in Lome, Togo, in 1963 to bring together new and potential leaders of the countries of West Africa to find African solutions for African problems. It was from the Lome office that International Dialogues program head, John Volkmar, monitored the rising tensions in Nigeria. At the same time, Adam Curle, a Harvard professor with education and economic development experience in Ghana and Western Nigeria, began to wonder whether his recent conciliation experience with a Quaker mission in the India-Pakistan conflict could be of use in Nigeria.

The first contact with one of the Nigerian parties was made by the man who became the third member of the Quaker team, Walter Martin, who had joined the Quaker United Nations Office after 10 years of reconstruction and reconciliation work in Kenya. Martin arranged a meeting for himself and Curle with Joseph

Iyalla, the Nigerian deputy permanent representative to the United Nations, on January 4, 1967, six months before the outbreak of fighting. The two Quakers offered assistance as channels of communication between the different parts of the country. Iyalla, who had been the first Nigerian to attend a Quaker conference for diplomats,[9] encouraged Curle to make private, unofficial explorations on an upcoming business trip to Nigeria.

With authorization from the two Quaker service agencies, the American Friends Service Committee in Philadelphia and British Friends Peace and Service in London, Curle and Volkmar toured all regions of Nigeria for four weeks in April and May to gather information and seek ways of helping relieve tensions through conciliation or humanitarian aid. In the East they met Ojukwu and most of the other key people later involved in peace negotiations and as Biafran representatives in Western Europe and the United States. In Lagos they met two federal officials, Okoi Arikpo, soon to become commissioner of external affairs, and Hamzat Ahmadu, principal secretary to Gowon who, like Iyalla, was an alumnus of a Quaker seminar.

With the outbreak of the war in July 1967, Martin reiterated the Quaker offer of conciliatory work or relief in a meeting with Iyalla and Arikpo in New York. The Quakers decided subsequently, however, to support an African initiative: the Consultative Committee of six African heads of state, which was created by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to deal with the Nigerian problem (discussed in greater detail later in this chapter). But the Consultative Committee, bound by its authorizing resolution, did not pursue a mediation role; at its first meeting, in November 1967, it called on Biafra to renounce secession and to accept the federal offer of peace in the context of a united Nigeria.

The decisive move for the Quakers came as a result of a meeting, on other Quaker business, between John Volkmar and Hamani Diori, the president of Niger and a member of the Consultative Committee. In light of the committee's having, in essence, taken the federal side in the conflict, Diori suggested that the Quakers, with their unofficial status and long conference experience, might be able to convene a secret meeting of lower level officials from the two sides to search for possible areas of agreement.

The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) in Philadelphia authorized a second trip by Volkmar and Curle to Nigeria. Although there was some disagreement as to whether it should be a high-level conciliation effort (Curle's view) or a lower level meeting (favored by AFSC staff), all agreed on "proceeding as the way opened," in the time-honored Quaker fashion.[10]

This time, the two Quakers felt that an early meeting with General Gowon, whom they had not met previously, would be the key to the whole trip. When a letter to Principal Secretary Ahmadu did not open the door, it was Edwin Ogbu, minister of external affairs (later permanent representative to the United Nations) and the third federal official with a firsthand acquaintance with Quakers, who helped them gain access to General Gowon.[11]

At a meeting on February 3, 1968, the Nigerian head of state, who had himself learned of the Quakers through his schooling in British and American history,[12]

listened to their proposal for a secret meeting and agreed that they should pursue the idea with the rebel side. He authorized them to travel there, although cautioning that he could not guarantee their safety as all flights into the rebel enclave were suspected of carrying arms and were therefore targets of federal antiaircraft gunners.[13]

So began the Quaker conciliation mission, which continued throughout the course of the war. Four times the team members, traveling in pairs,[14] made hazardous trips into Biafra for meetings with officials (twice with Ojukwu), and eight times they held consultations with federal officials (six times with Gowon). They also met with representatives of the two sides in New York, Washington, London, Paris, Geneva, and Lisbon and worked in a variety of ways to support other third-party efforts.

THE QUAKER APPROACH TO CONCILIATION

The exploration of a possible meeting to be convened under Quaker auspices—an idea that reemerged at a later time when, as initially, other peacemaking efforts were stalled—served as an opening point of discussion for the Quaker team with Nigerian leader Gowon and, upon receiving encouragement from him, with Biafran leader Ojukwu. It also set in motion two of the three key aspects of the Quakers' conciliation role in the conflict: opening lines of communication; reducing suspicions, misperceptions, and fears; and advocating for a negotiated settlement while supporting official mediation efforts.

Opening Lines of Communication

Gowon, although doubtful about the prospects for a Quaker meeting since so many other meeting attempts had failed, was nonetheless willing to consider it and authorized Volkmar and Curle to travel to the rebel enclave. He also said he would be very interested in hearing their report from the other side and asked them to tell Ojukwu that as soon as a cease-fire was agreed upon, he would stop the federal advance and bring in a third party to police the lines (a new and significant point, they later learned).

This was the first of at least five times during the Quaker mission when team members were specifically requested to carry a message from one leader to the other. Numerous other times they reported back, as a matter of course, to one side following a meeting with the other. It was always their practice to be entirely open about their travels and the individuals with whom they had met. They consistently shared their impressions of conditions and attitudes on the other side, to the extent possible without violating confidentiality or providing information that might give one side a military advantage. They also, on several occasions, made substantive suggestions of their own that they thought might help break an impasse in negotiations.

One episode (see pp. 101–2) found the Quakers carrying to Lagos concessions being offered by the Biafrans that they felt they could not present at formal peace talks for fear of appearing weak. The importance of the Quaker team's role of opening lines of communication was also highlighted in another incident. After an outburst against the Nigerians, as well as the United States and the United Kingdom, during a meeting with the Quakers, a Biafran official apologized saying, "You see, you are the closest we can get to Lagos."[15]

But in carrying messages, writes Curle, the Quaker conciliator does not consider himself to be a "passive postman." He acts instead as an emissary, a participant "in the total situation whose task is to try to change it in a direction that, in general *both sets of protagonists want*."[16] The conciliator also actively tries to remove obstacles to the next step in peacemaking: negotiation. This involves the second aspect of the conciliation role.

Reducing Suspicions, Misperceptions, and Fears

Writing shortly after his experience in Nigeria, Adam Curle described the suspicion, distrust, faulty perceptions, and poor communications that accompany deteriorating relations in times of war. The central purpose of conciliation, then, is to correct misperceptions, to reduce unreasonable fears, and to improve communications to an extent that reasonable discussion can take place and rational bargaining becomes possible.[17]

Curle believes that the things that separate people are relatively easy to solve. But it is necessary to change people's perception of—to help them "re-perceive"—their enemies, themselves, and the whole situation so that they can accept what might otherwise be a simple solution.[18]

Though he has described conciliation as "essentially an applied psychological tactic,"[19] the Quaker practice of conciliation is impelled and informed by Quaker faith, and Curle has himself written and spoken of its religious underpinnings. "Virtually the sole dogma," he writes, "if this word is not too emphatic, of Friends concerns 'that of God in every one'."[20] Characterized as a "divine spark" in each person,

> this gives us [the conciliators and the parties] a real relationship. Literally, we are all connected. . . . One cannot be hostile or violent toward another without being hostile or violent toward oneself. . . . In working for peace I am simply doing what I've sensed is carrying out a normal human function: to realize—make real—the bond between us all.[21]

To carry messages faithfully and to truly understand the parties' attitudes, perceptions, and fears demands of the conciliator a carefully cultivated skill at listening. For the Quaker conciliator, however, listening has a spiritual function as well. Curle has described it this way:

> To listen attentively is to act autonomously. . . . Thus as in prayer, so in listening we try to reach a deeper part of our being.
>
> Moreover, listening does not only lead to hearing and understanding, but also to speech. If we learn to listen, we will often find that the right words are given to us.

These do not come as a result of careful thought, but spring from our more profound sources of knowledge.

The importance of listening, then, is not only that we "hear" the other in a profound sense but communicate with him or her through our true nature. For this reason very strong and positive feelings are often aroused in both the listener and the one listened to. In this way peace makers may reach the part of the other person that is really able to make peace, outwardly as well as inwardly.[22]

Quaker conciliators strive "never [to] point the finger at a single guilty party," recognizing that "everything that happens is the product of the convergence of multiple forces of which some may only appear more directly responsible than others."[23] Quakers will engage in the practice of "speaking truth to power," however, trusting that "when the relationship is founded on real liking and the anguished words are spoken without rage they will really be heard and acted upon."[24]

In the Nigerian civil war, for example, on two occasions team members informed Gowon that hospitals and markets in the rebel enclave had been targets of Nigerian bombers. The first time, though shocked and saddened, Gowon replied to Martin and Curle that perhaps this would serve the "good purpose" of making the rebels "realize that rebellion doesn't pay and so lay down their arms." To this Curle responded that in fact, the bombing had had the opposite effect of causing people to think that the charges of genocide against the Ibo people must be true, and they might as well go on fighting as long as possible, rather than waiting to be massacred.[25] When after a visit to Biafra a month later Volkmar and Martin again raised the issue of the bombing of civilian targets, Gowon responded that he had given strict instructions for accurate bombing of military installations only, but perhaps the time had come to reissue the order.[26] On the Biafran side, on the other hand, the Quakers did what they could (although apparently to little avail) to explain that these bombings were not intentional but rather hits by inexperienced pilots.

Advocating for a Negotiated Settlement and Supporting Official Mediation Efforts

In all that the Quaker conciliators did in Nigeria, their overarching goal was to end the suffering on all sides by promoting a peaceful settlement of the conflict. As nonofficial actors, untrained in diplomacy, they had no pretensions of taking the lead in mediating formal peace talks. They saw their role as a support to such official efforts as appeared to have any chance of making progress.

The substance of Quaker discussions with the parties dealt very much with the political, economic, and military issues in the conflict—with positions and possible terms of settlement. Their message was never religious per se, but in certain respects it might be considered spiritual. The "desire of the Quakers for peace was well-known, their anti-war stance," according to former Biafran Commissioner of Commerce and Industry Sylvanus Cookey.[27] Some top advisers to Gowon, in

fact, were initially concerned that a Quaker influence on Gowon—"himself a pacifist by nature, a Christian gentleman"—might lead to a deliberate slowing down of the war.[28] Their fears proved to be unfounded.

The Quaker message with regard to war, according to Volkmar, was that "no problem is ever resolved by war. War only postpones the problem, and it is destructive, expensive, and painful. Ultimately you will have to sit down together."[29] Volkmar adds that he and his colleagues were not trying to sell Gowon on Quakerism, but they did talk about peace, reconciliation, and the potential to resolve conflict nonviolently. A key theme in their discussions with the Biafran side, according to one close observer, was that Gowon's offer of amnesty could be trusted and that the Ibos would not be punished if they laid down their arms.[30]

ENVOYS, PEACE SEEKERS, AND PEACEMAKERS: OTHER INTERMEDIARY EFFORTS

The Nigerian civil war was surely one of the most mediated conflicts in recent history. Quaker conciliation efforts over the course of the conflict ran parallel to—and in a number of cases intersected with—numerous other attempts to bring a negotiated settlement to the conflict. No fewer than 16 African leaders became involved in some capacity, in addition to a number of British and American political leaders, ministers, and legislators. Numerous international, regional, and subregional organizations sought to mediate or in some way promote peace, as did a variety of religious figures and institutions, and even two Western academics.[31]

Two initiatives, those of the Commonwealth Secretariat and the Organization of African Unity, succeeded to the extent of convening formal peace talks, although none of the attempts at peacemaking proved successful in ending the war. Discussed here are the Commonwealth and OAU efforts, the Quaker interface with those efforts, and the Quaker relationship to other more limited initiatives.

Commonwealth Secretariat

The most sustained official-level peacemaking initiative in the Nigerian civil war—and the initiative with which the Quaker team cooperated most closely—was that conducted by Commonwealth Secretary-General Arnold Smith and a number of top deputies on the secretariat staff. Over the course of much of the civil war, the secretariat was active, primarily behind the scenes, in trying to establish terms for a cease-fire and enough substantive common ground to make formal peace talks viable. Smith and his colleagues had many contacts with the two sides by phone and mail and in confidential consultations in London, Lagos, and elsewhere.[32]

Smith's first overtures to the parties were made in the early months of 1967, prior to the outbreak of fighting. But although both Gowon and Ojukwu indicated they would welcome a visit from him, there was no support for a Commonwealth

peacemaking mission while General Ankrah of Ghana was still trying to mediate an agreement based on the Aburi accords.[33] In addition, Biafran leaders made it clear that they would not accept any arbitration or mediation involving formal British participation; they were profoundly suspicious of British motives based on their interpretation of colonial history and the British role in establishing northern dominance in the Nigerian federation. Ojukwu also believed that the British were responsible for persuading Gowon to backtrack on the Aburi accords.[34]

In Nairobi at the time of Biafra's declaration of independence on May 30, 1967, Smith was urged by East African presidents Milton Obote of Uganda, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia to go to Lagos to caution Gowon against starting hostilities against the secessionists. But while in London awaiting an invitation from Gowon, Smith received word that the federal government had decided to launch its police action against the East. "Any time for mediation had now passed," Gowon informed him. When Smith finally did meet with Gowon in Lagos on July 7, the Nigerian leader established a precondition that would be repeated many times in the months ahead: no negotiations could be held—and no official travel authorized to the rebel side—unless Ojukwu renounced secession. Smith learned shortly thereafter that hostilities had broken out the day before his meeting with Gowon.[35]

The secretary-general and his colleagues remained active for the next 11 months, trying to bring the parties together for talks at the ministerial level. A flurry of activity in October 1967 seemed to hold promise of progress, only to founder in a pattern that Smith portrays as illustrative of "the general flow of negotiations" as he experienced them.[36] Secret talks between officials of Nigeria and Biafra were scheduled for late October in Smith's London flat, but the two Biafran representatives were delayed for 10 days by "mechanical difficulties." Meanwhile, Ojukwu complained about the British venue and the level of representatives sent by the federal side. During the period of waiting, Smith was able to bring another Biafran emissary and a more junior Biafran together with the Nigerians for exploratory talks. But by the time the missing negotiators arrived from Biafra, their Nigerian counterparts had left. Back in Lagos, Cabinet hardliners wanted to pull out of the London talks, but Gowon and Foreign Minister Arikpo convinced them to send the team back to London. By the time the Nigerians arrived, however, the Biafrans had left for France.[37]

Writes Smith, this episode gave him

> a first sight of Ojukwu's pattern for wrecking talks. While keeping an international reputation for being ready to enter negotiations—a reputation for reasonableness he recognised as essential if he was to win sympathy and, best of all, recognition for Biafra—he was wary of entering any real discussions that might involve compromise. So he allowed them to be set up, and then played for a breakdown.[38]

Smith's continued efforts to bring the two sides together were finally crowned with success when in May 1968 formal peace talks under Commonwealth auspices, and hosted by Ugandan President Milton Obote, were held in Kampala.

Preliminary to the formal talks were days of meetings between the two parties, held in Smith's London flat, to agree on the venue and agenda for the formal negotiations to follow.

The Quakers, who by now had established a relationship of trust with leaders in both Nigeria and Biafra, as well as with members of the Commonwealth Secretariat, felt it was important to have a representative in London to be in touch with both sides and try to help in the search for a peaceful solution.[39] Walter Martin, sent by the British and American Quaker service bodies, had long talks with the chief negotiators on the Biafran side, Chief Justice Sir Louis Mbanefo and Dr. Eni Njoku, and a shorter talk with Nigeria's senior representative, Chief Anthony Enahoro. Although he made several suggestions aimed at resolving points of impasse, Martin's major contribution was to reassure the Biafrans that the Commonwealth Secretariat was impartial and to persuade them to go to the peace talks.[40]

Adam Curle and his wife, Anne, were then dispatched to Kampala to provide a Quaker presence during the nine days of talks, May 23–31, 1968. Their terms of reference, in effect, were expressed in a letter by the Philadelphia AFSC staff:

> It must be understood of course that our role in this whole process is a very humble one. We do not presume to be acting as major negotiators in any way. We are merely hoping to put our relationship of confidence to good use on both sides.[41]

Or, as Adam Curle was to write at the conclusion of the talks:

> It is not our role to arrange a conference such as this. . . . But there is a lot of persuasion, clarification, message carrying, listening, defusing, honest brokering, encouraging, and liaison with the Commonwealth Secretariat to be done.[42]

This he had plenty of opportunity to do at the talks. From the start, the public positions taken by the two sides were incompatible; therefore, much of the intermediary activity went on behind the scenes. Three sets of proposals were put forward: a cease-fire proposal by the Biafrans, a counterproposal by the Nigerians, and a compromise developed by Smith and his colleagues in separate talks with the parties. Although private talks suggested some possible flexibility, negotiations collapsed when Biafran chief negotiator Mbanefo took a hard line in a May 31 plenary speech, which was later revealed to have been drafted in Ojukwu's headquarters well before the talks had begun.[43] Smith had tried to salvage the process by talking to the parties directly and through messages carried by Curle. Curle had also given all parties copies of a Quaker paper suggesting a substantive solution to their problem.

As the talks broke down, Smith decided not to expose Ojukwu's posturing at the request of Mbanefo, who believed he could convince the Biafran leadership to resume talks in London within a month. Mbanefo then left for London to put the Biafran case before the international press. Ojukwu, as it turned out, did not allow the Biafran negotiators to return to London for further talks.[44]

It is unlikely that the Biafrans ever accepted Smith as an entirely impartial third party. The secretary-general undertook to act in a purely personal capacity, both to avoid being interpreted as conferring international legitimacy on the Biafrans and to avoid the obvious identification of the Commonwealth with Great Britain. But both Biafran and Nigerian sources suggest that the two sides considered the Commonwealth secretary-general to be "little more than a stalking horse for British interests."[45]

In any case, although Smith continued his efforts to re-start the peace talks in London for some time—and though he never ceased to monitor events for opportunities to promote negotiations, at times with the help of information gathered by the Quakers on trips to Lagos and Biafra—the peacemaking initiative was now taken up again by the OAU. Only much later, in November 1969, was there the renewed prospect of the action returning to the Commonwealth Secretariat's court. Before anything definite could be launched, however, the war had come to an abrupt end.

Organization of African Unity

Throughout the Nigerian civil war there was a strong feeling in many African quarters that there should be an African solution to the crisis. But, as with every other attempt to settle the conflict away from the battlefield, the various African initiatives attempted were unsuccessful. One group did succeed in at least getting the parties as far as the bargaining table: the Organization of African Unity.[46]

The OAU first dealt with the Nigerian crisis at a meeting of the Assembly of Heads of State in Kinshasa in September 1967, shortly after the outbreak of the war. Gowon's representative at the meeting, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, was successful in preventing formal discussion of the conflict by the assembly and in heading off a move to create an ad hoc mediatory committee. Instead, the assembly established a Consultative Committee of six heads of state (Haile Selassie of Ethiopia as chair, Joseph Mobutu of Congo/Zaire, William Tubman of Liberia, Joseph Ankrah of Ghana, Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon, and Hamani Diori of Niger) with the mission of assuring the head of the Nigerian government "of the Assembly's desire for the territorial integrity, unity and peace of Nigeria." This stand in opposition to secession was reiterated at the Consultative Committee's first meeting in Lagos two months later, a position that left Ojukwu no room to maneuver and prevented the group from serving in the capacity of mediator. After the Lagos meeting, the committee did not take action again for eight months.

In July 1968, after the Kampala talks had failed, the Consultative Committee was reconvened, this time in Niamey by President Diori. Gowon and Ojukwu each addressed the group on separate days in what turned out to be preliminary negotiations for a second round of formal peace talks. Held in Addis Ababa under the chairmanship of Emperor Selassie, the talks lasted a month, from August 5 to September 6.

Present for the opening session, Ojukwu held forth in a two-hour speech that equated the physical survival of the Biafran people with the sovereign independence of the Biafran state. When Gowon himself failed to appear, however, Ojukwu abruptly departed on August 6, leaving Eni Njoku as delegation head but effectively foreclosing any possibility for substantive negotiations.[47]

The federal proposal made in Addis Ababa showed a somewhat greater sensitivity than earlier to Ibo fears of physical abuse at the hands of an occupying force and indicated new flexibility regarding the possible introduction of an "external force" after fighting ceased. The Biafran proposal was essentially the same as at Kampala: for Biafra to rejoin the Nigerian federation, it must retain responsibility for its internal security, have an armed force of its own, and have the ability to join international organizations in its own right. When, after a week and a half, the peace talks became stalemated, Selassie turned to the subject of transportation of relief supplies. He eventually adjourned the conference to prepare for an upcoming OAU summit.

Although the Quaker team members had not tried to get to the preliminary OAU talks in Niamey, they thought it would be important for them to provide support to the formal talks in Addis Ababa. Adam Curle checked into the hotel where the Nigerian delegation stayed, while John and Joanne Volkmar stayed in the same hotel as the Biafran delegation. This time the talks were conducted with a high degree of formality and tight security, making it difficult for the Quaker team to make quiet, private contacts with the parties as they had in Kampala. And there were few openings for contact with the conference organizers, the OAU Secretariat and Ethiopian government. Volkmar reported in a letter that the general atmosphere of the talks was one of propaganda warfare rather than of conciliation.[48]

After about a week of the talks, the Volkmars and Curle decided to go to Lagos to do something they had not previously done: present their own view on an issue that deeply concerned them. They (and others) had begun to fear that a disastrous guerrilla struggle would be waged by the rebels in the event of a federal victory and occupation of the major Biafran population centers. They felt they should speak out as tactfully as possible, even at risk of offending Gowon.[49]

Then, on the eve of their departure, Biafran chief negotiator Njoku revealed privately to the Quakers new terms that his government would be willing to accept but could not state openly for fear of appearing to weaken. Would Volkmar and Curle communicate these proposals to the federal government? Njoku maintained that Biafra was prepared to give up its insistence on sovereignty and would be flexible on cease-fire lines, boundaries of an eventual state, composition of a peacekeeping force, and the name of a state (implying a compromise on the name *Biafra*). But it could not compromise on the need for an independent armed force within cease-fire lines and having some degree of international standing.[50]

So on August 14, 1968, Curle and Volkmar presented the Njoku proposals to Gowon, together with suggestions of their own on ways of meeting the Biafrans' two key conditions. Apologizing for their temerity, they also expressed their

hope for a negotiated settlement to avoid the threat of extended guerrilla activity, a prospect Gowon dismissed as infeasible for the rebels without a good supply line from the outside. As the Quakers left Gowon's headquarters in Dodan Barracks, they passed a group of senior field commanders gathering for an important meeting. They later learned that their report had aroused a controversy in the inner councils of government as to whether the concessions being offered were of significance. But the hawks prevailed; two days later federal officials informed Volkmar of the decision to pursue the war into the Ibo heartland.[51]

The OAU, for its part, did not pursue efforts to mediate the Nigerian conflict again until eight months later when, in April 1969, the Consultative Committee convened a round of preliminary negotiations in Monrovia, which were unsuccessful in establishing a justification for resumption of full-scale talks. A final effort was made by Selassie just one month before the war's end when, in December 1969, he hosted a round of talks in Addis Ababa. This time they broke up due to a prior ambiguity as to the nature of the auspices under which the meeting was to be conducted (Selassie acting as an African head of state, auspices acceptable to the Biafrans, versus Selassie acting under OAU auspices, which is what the Nigerians understood to be the case).

Other Initiatives

At one level, the fact that the Quakers were a religious organization helped open the door for them to Gowon, so eager was the federal side to make its case that this was not a religious war of Muslims against Christians, as the early Biafran propaganda maintained.[52] But admittance was by no means a guarantee that the federal door would remain open and the welcome hospitable as, indeed, it proved to be for the Quakers throughout the course of the war.

In this respect, the Quakers were unique among the many religious actors that became involved in the conflict. Because the Eastern Region of Nigeria is predominantly Christian, Western churches, particularly the Roman Catholic church, became deeply involved in providing humanitarian aid to the Biafrans. Most religious figures who made efforts to promote peace were therefore highly suspect on the federal side, and their peacemaking attempts were unsuccessful.[53]

Of the nonofficial third parties, only the Quakers won the acceptance of both sides and sustained their involvement for the duration of the civil war. On two occasions, however, they put their own credibility on the line by sponsoring non-Quaker initiatives that they believed held some promise for progress. Neither the effort to secure a truce by Harvard Professor Roger Fisher nor that by U.S. Representative Charles Diggs to secure agreement on opening a new airstrip for relief supplies to Biafra met with success, however. The Quakers came to realize the threat these outside involvements had posed to their own position of trust with the parties when, after the war, some Nigerian authorities privately criticized them for having aided the efforts of other parties whose neutrality the Nigerians questioned.[54]

WHY EFFORTS AT A NEGOTIATED PEACE FAILED

The Nigeria-Biafra conflict became the world's first public relations war, with Biafran propaganda proving highly effective in putting the plight of the Biafran people before the eyes of the world—and in shaping the perceptions of Biafran citizens about the threat posed by the Nigerian government and military. The most effective propaganda theme, internationally and internally, proved to be that the Biafrans were victims of a war of genocide, a charge that had more to do with the anti-Ibo pogroms that occurred before the war than with the Nigerians' conduct of the war itself.[55] With the help of Markpress News Feature Services, a Geneva public relations firm, Biafra had gained widespread press coverage—and massive popular sympathy—in Europe and the United States by mid-1968.

By the end of the war, however, the genocide charge had very little credibility, in large part due to the activities of an international observer team, which Gowon had invited into the battle zone to investigate charges of misconduct by federal troops and to observe the federal treatment of prisoners and civilian refugees.[56] But the charge had also, by then, served to internationalize the Nigerian civil war and put Western governments that supported the Nigerians—or that failed to recognize Biafran secession—on the defensive by church and civic lobbies at home.[57]

Only one Western country, France, succumbed to domestic pressures to the extent that it provided a certain measure of political support for Biafra and, ultimately, became a significant supplier of arms.[58] French support, together with diplomatic recognition of Biafra by four African states, Tanzania, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, and Zambia, may have been decisive in prolonging the war at a critical moment for Biafra. The support came at the nadir of Biafran fortunes, in spring and summer 1968, when its army had suffered reversals on the battlefield and church humanitarian relief efforts had not yet reached a volume that could arrest the growing starvation. So at a time when the Kampala and Addis Ababa peace talks might have held the promise of a negotiated end to the war, the diplomatic recognition by the four African states and the prospect of French recognition increased Biafran confidence and strengthened the young republic's resolve to carry on the battle. French military assistance, channeled through Gabon and Côte d'Ivoire, started to flow to Biafra that September.[59]

On the battlefield, meanwhile, it proved to be a war that Nigeria could not win early but Biafra could not win late. With the loss of Northern and Western officers in the January coup and the flight of Ibo officers to Biafra, Gowon was initially fighting with a decimated officer corps. But once the federal government could call up reservists, it had superior resources to draw upon. It was able to purchase British arms throughout, but when, shortly after the outbreak of war, Britain and the United States both declined to sell Nigeria fighter aircraft, Gowon (declaring "I'll go to any devil to get what I need to keep my country united"[60]) turned to the Soviet Union to purchase a dozen reconditioned MIG-17 fighters. Once Nigeria had begun to demonstrate the capacity to defeat the secession, and having shown

its willingness to resort to Soviet suppliers, Western powers started to embrace the federal cause more openly.

Biafra, for its part, was never able to repeat the audacity of its early invasion of the Mid-West state, although it did sustain a stalemate on the battlefield for the last year or so of the war. When, 10 months into the war, its access to the sea through Port Harcourt was cut off (its border with Cameroon having already been sealed), Biafra was forced for the next 20 months to rely on airlifts of both food and military supplies. Hunger, corruption, and demoralization ultimately undermined the Biafran war effort.[61]

In light of Biafra's clear inability to secure its independence on the battlefield, by 1968 Ojukwu's overriding concern was to ensure maximum opportunities for Ibo political and economic self-determination within a united Nigeria.[62] He sought first of all an immediate and unconditional cease-fire, which would serve to halt Nigeria's military advance and freeze the status quo of two independent centers of power. Only then, according to the position taken by Biafra, could a full-scale peace conference be held that would work out Nigeria's future constitutional arrangements. Ojukwu refused to renounce secession until all other substantive matters had been resolved through negotiations; otherwise, he maintained, the Biafrans would not know what they were agreeing to.[63]

The federal government insisted that the negotiation process must begin, rather than end, with the renouncement of secession and saw the bargaining table as primarily a forum for determining the mechanics of surrender. Gowon opposed an unconditional cease-fire on the grounds that it would permit the rearming of rebel forces and thereby increase the danger of a prolonged conflict. And he never permitted the fundamental question of 12 states to be discussed in negotiations, arguing that any discussion of the country's constitutional arrangements could only take place among representatives of all of the 12 states.[64]

Yet this issue was critical to Ojukwu's effort to ensure equality for the Ibo people. He sought a return to the four-region framework with a separation of power and a high degree of autonomy, along the lines of the Aburi accords. Ultimately, concludes author John Stremlau:

> Ojukwu was certain that had Gowon been forced to accept a return to the four regions, this concession would have so undermined the viability of the wartime federal coalition that the ensuing political chaos would have opened the way for a full revival of the "Biafran spirit" and possibly the forging of an Ojukwu-dominated southern alliance.[65]

Citing a postwar interview with Ojukwu, Stremlau adds:

> However astonishing it may seem in retrospect, Ojukwu firmly believed in December 1969 [one month before Biafra's final defeat] that Biafra possessed the means to fight on long enough to force a political settlement with Nigeria, and this would allow him sufficient independence to survive in power and gradually undermine Gowon's authority in Lagos.[66]

That the recently defeated Ojukwu should so unabashedly admit to his former grand ambitions lends support to the view expressed by many who attribute the civil war—or at least the prolongation of the war—largely to Ojukwu's ambition. The Oxford-educated Ojukwu was widely known to have elected a career in the military because he saw it as the most promising path to political power. For example, Edwin Ogbu, former Nigerian ambassador to the United Nations, recounts his first meeting with Ojukwu in 1957. Ogbu was working in Kaduna, and Ojukwu came for a medical examination to join the army. Asked by Ogbu why he was joining, Ojukwu said he believed the army would take over the government of Nigeria, and he wanted to be there. After the first coup in 1966, Ogbu challenged Ojuwku about that statement, and the latter responded that he remembered it well.[68]

By Arnold Smith's assessment of him, Ojukwu

> soon showed himself dominant and persuasive over his Biafran followers, but he was blindly unrealistic in the broader arena of world politics. He somehow believed he would win if he persevered until a magic number of countries recognised Biafra. Like many others, I came to the view that he was determined to play for all or nothing, although many of those around him were sincere seekers of a compromise settlement.[68]

Smith's perceptions were confirmed by Biafra's most prominent citizen, Nnamdi Azikiwe, who served from 1964 until the January 1966 coup as the first president of Nigeria. As early as October 1968, Azikiwe confided to Smith his disillusionment caused by Ojukwu's intransigence in the failed peace talks. Azikiwe said he had persuaded Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere to recognize Biafra in April 1968 on the assurance from Ojukwu that the recognition would be used to increase his bargaining power at Kampala and thereby improve the chances of an agreement, since Ojukwu planned to accept the principle of a united Nigeria as the basis for a settlement. Azikiwe said he felt he had been used to mislead Nyerere by Ojukwu's false pretenses.[69] Ten months later, in August 1969, in a dramatic reversal, Azikiwe declared his support for a united Nigeria and subsequently permitted Radio Nigeria to repeatedly beam his appeal for surrender into the Ibo heartland.[70]

In the final analysis, probably the greatest significance in the interpretation that the war could be attributed to the "personal ambition of a person and his clique" lay in the fact that this view was held by Nigerian Head of State Gowon.[71] It helped him withstand pressures within his cabinet from hard-liners who favored an occupation and punishment of the rebels in the event of a federal victory. In the words of Principal Secretary Hamzat Ahmadu, who worked closely with Gowon throughout the war: "Gowon's vision, his philosophy, was that you are fighting your brother—a misguided brother. . . . He believed this from beginning to end—almost alone. We used to say that we must separate the misleaders from the misled."[72]

Not only does this formulation of the war help explain the reserve with which the federal side prosecuted the war and the amnesty extended to Biafrans immediately following their defeat. It also helps account for Gowon's own intransigence in negotiations with the secessionists. A speech Gowon made before the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government on September 10, 1969, in Monrovia is illustrative:

> General Gowon spoke last. He did not appeal for support, but offered a personal account of his past association with Ojukwu since their days in military college. It was a rather shrewd attempt to personalize the enemy of Nigerian and African unity in order to convince the assembly that his regime harbored no vindictiveness toward the Ibo people. Ojukwu, he claimed, had invited him to join a budding coup against the Balewa government in January 1965 and, until the federal army repulsed the rebel blitz through the Midwest in August 1967, Ojukwu's overriding ambition was to rule all Nigeria. Deprived of this option, Gowon suggested that his adversary would exploit any opportunity to remain in power in the East. A cease-fire, he warned, would merely reward Ojukwu's intransigence and thereby prolong the suffering of the Ibo people.[73]

IMPACT OF THE QUAKER MISSION

That the Quaker conciliators won the trust, respect, and, in some cases, the affection of the Nigerian and Biafran leaders with whom they dealt cannot be in question. In the words of Joseph Iyalla, the Nigerian who from his post at the United Nations helped launch the Quaker mission, the team was successful in gaining "a good hearing and complete and uninhibited acceptability by all sides."[74]

The parties' assessment of the Quakers' motives—together with the Quakers' obvious lack of a political or denominational interest in the conflict—appears to have been central to their acceptance. Again, quoting Iyalla:

> [The] Quakers were readily perceived as friends who did not favor one side or the other but understood the underlying commitments on both sides that gave rise to all this ferment. They were obviously regarded as having no particular ax to grind, but at the same time as being genuinely concerned. They were factors in the equation.[75]

For General Gowon there was a religious element to their acceptance as well. He said he found "no difficulty in my relating to them. They were another sect of Christians, though not a formal organization. The basis is a belief in God and humanity." Gowon attributed their motivation to an "abhorrence for any war or violence."[76]

While not discounting the religious dimension, a third former federal official and one who had close contact with the Quakers, Hamzat Ahmadu, highlighted

the human dimension in the Nigerians' relationship with the Quakers: "We embraced them more with an open heart than perhaps others with religious dogma, such as the Catholics, the bulk of Southern Christians, and the Muslims in the North. We saw them as a religious people but [also] as friends."[77]

From Ojukwu's point of view, it was the Quakers' nonofficial status and their denominational disinterestedness that were critical factors in their acceptance by the parties:

> It was a civil conflict therefore the element of suspicion was very large. Any political actor would be suspect; only a nonpolitical actor would have a chance of bringing the two sides together or giving the necessary type of assurance—not of security, but rather an umbrella under which you go in and you don't lose anything. Other churches . . . were suspect. With the Quakers, no one could say that Biafra was their mission.[78]

Ojukwu attributed the Quakers' motivation to their "absolute dedication to humanity" and saw the trust they achieved as based on "an infinite capacity for neutrality."[79]

The Quakers were also credited with being more modest and discreet than some of the other third parties who sought to become involved in the Nigerian conflict and with not having an agenda of their own to promote. Said Ahmadu: "The effect and confidence might be more than with publicity and ostentation as with a party doing it to get results or publicity. It was devoid of any publicity; they just wanted to do the job."[80]

But what of the Quakers' success and impact based on their own threefold set of objectives?

Opening Lines of Communication

Gowon credits the Quakers for both their constancy and their faithfulness in performing this particular task:

> They are the group that one would never forget. They persisted right the way through and were accepted. I did not feel betrayed or let down by their effort and knew that the message did get to the other [side].[81]

Allison Ayida, who served as permanent secretary to the Nigerian Ministry of Economic Development and was a member of every negotiating team fielded by the Nigerians, said he thought the Quakers' "most useful role was not so much peacemaking as the communication gap they filled."[82]

The most significant example of message-carrying was the Biafran proposal sent by chief negotiator Eni Njoku in Addis Ababa via the Quakers to Gowon in Lagos. Given a more favorable environment for negotiations, the new terms being offered by Biafra might have produced a breakthrough. For a host of reasons, however, they did not.

The value to the two parties of the Quakers' message-carrying function was perhaps best demonstrated by their *not* taking actions to prevent it. Gowon consistently refused to authorize travel to the rebel enclave by official-level actors such as the OAU Consultative Committee and Commonwealth Secretary-General Arnold Smith, insisting that this would confer political legitimacy on the breakaway region and internationalize the conflict. Nonofficial actors such as the Vatican envoys were told that they could visit the other side at their own risk, and, indeed, those were the terms under which the Quakers undertook their own hazardous trips into Biafra.[83] It appears, however, that the Quakers were the only third party specifically *requested* by Gowon to carry messages for him into the rebel enclave, and he was deeply appreciative of their willingness to incur both the hardships and dangers of such travel on the Nigerians' behalf.[84]

Ojukwu, for his part, was known to use visits from the outside to score propaganda points against his adversary.[85] The Quakers' first visit to Biafra after the war began was carefully monitored on the federal side for this type of publicity that would signal a manipulative use of the Quakers on the part of the Biafrans. When no mention was made of the Quaker visit on Biafran radio, the Nigerians concluded that the rebels were serious about using the Quakers as a channel of communication.[86]

Reducing Suspicions, Misperceptions, and Fears

The first step in performing this aspect of the conciliation role is listening empathetically to understand the parties' fears and concerns. Ojukwu eloquently expressed the way in which the Biafrans felt listened to and cared for by the Quakers:

> I saw them as highly objective and, then, being a church organization they never lacked in sympathy, which again helps in such a situation. Don't ever say to me, "Oh, 50 people were killed, oh well, that happens," and tell you let's go on. No, when you say to the Quakers, "this is what happened," there is a silence for a bit. There is a fellow human feeling for the tragedy, which is fully understood, and they then take that into consideration in their responses.[87]

The next step is to communicate this information in a way that it can be understood—and acted upon—by the other side. There is some evidence that this process occurred with both the Nigerians and Biafrans. On the federal side, the Quakers' main contribution may have been to help the leadership realize that, after a certain stage in the war, the Biafrans were motivated more by fear than by malevolence. Arnold Smith sees this as not having been so much a case of shaping Gowon's concern, for Gowon "was always concerned. But there were a lot of people [around him] with a different view." Smith believes the Quakers may have strengthened Gowon's determination to prevent a federal occupation of the Ibo heartland and vengeance on the part of federal troops—and bolstered Gowon's position in this regard among others in the Nigerian leadership who took a more hard-line position.[88]

This view coincides with John Volkmar's own sense of the Quakers' impact on Gowon: that Gowon's respect for them helped give legitimacy to his natural conciliatory inclinations.

> Gowon respected Adam as a professor and me for the work I did. You didn't have to be a freak to be for peace. Gowon was young [in his early thirties] and had little experience in the real world. . . . He took a lot of risks. His respect for us made him think about the things we talked about.[89]

In a similar vein, according to Arnold Smith, the Quakers were able to help some among the Biafran leadership believe that Gowon was "genuine in his concern for unity" and in his lack of desire for vengeance against the Ibo people.[90] Biafran London representative Ignatius Kogbara explained the effect on some Biafrans' thinking of the Quaker belief in the essential goodness of every person:

> That is, in fact, a conflict point. When you are at war and there are people in the Nigerian government with a strong Muslim background, seeing some element of goodness in them is a conflict point. . . . The Quakers would think there was something good in the federal government and in us. . . . They saw Gowon as basically a good man. It helped some of us to be sympathetic.[91]

Kogbara concluded that, ultimately, the Quakers' best contribution may have been that "they tried to resolve the hardness of the heart."[92]

This resonance between the Quakers and the more peace-oriented individuals on the Biafran side seems to have played itself out in a very practical way once the war was over. Allison Ayida credits them with having helped federal officials "identify which people on the Biafran side were most likely to assist in establishing a lasting peace. They could identify the peace lovers in influential positions."[93]

Advocating for a Negotiated Settlement and Supporting Official Mediation Efforts

The Quakers had a direct impact on the peace process, according to Biafran representative Kogbara who, from his base in London, had frequent contact with the Quaker conciliators. Kogbara acknowledges that the Biafrans were "the more recalcitrant side" when it came to negotiations, but "the Quakers did succeed in persuading us to go to the peace conferences and keep talking while the war was going on."[94] Kogbara says that during the preliminary stages prior to the Kampala talks, he had become convinced of the Quakers' sincerity and was in a position to communicate his views to C. C. Mojekwu, the Biafran commissioner of home affairs and Ojukwu's closest confidant.

Smith, the convener of the Kampala talks, supports this assessment of the Quaker contribution:

> They played a considerable part before the Kampala talks in encouraging key people around Ojukwu to favor talking—and afterwards. . . . Their total influence was

very considerable in preparing attitudes that would favor talking to Gowon's representatives.[95]

It would appear that, although the ultimate goal of peace escaped the Quakers along with the several dozen other envoys, peace seekers, and peacemakers in the Nigeria-Biafra conflict, the Quakers did achieve a measure of success in the performance of each of the specific functions of their conciliation role as they themselves defined it.

CONCLUSION

In his own study of the Quaker mission in Nigeria, C. H. Mike Yarrow, with characteristic Quaker modesty, describes the Quaker "enterprise" as a "small footnote" to a complicated story with many important actors. "In enlarging that footnote to fill many pages," he acknowledges, "there is an inevitable distortion, making the Quaker effort appear more important than it was."[96] Curle and Volkmar are themselves cautious when pressed to assess their role in the Nigeria mission.[97] Theirs was a quiet, totally behind-the-scenes effort—a support role in most respects. And the core of what they aspired to do—to get the parties to "re-perceive" their enemies, themselves, and the conflict so that progress could be made toward peace—is virtually impossible to measure.

All of that said, what can be concluded about the value, impact, significance, and replicability of their involvement? And what of the spiritual dimension?

The first conclusion to be reached is that the Quakers were genuinely appreciated and valued for what they did. Although they never spoke of religion, the people with whom the Quakers met were well aware of their pacifist convictions and assumed a spiritual motivation behind their work. Asked what he thought motivated the Quakers, Ignatius Kogbara replied, "God." For Yakubu Gowon, it was "a belief in God and humanity." For Emeka Ojukwu, "an absolute dedication to humanity." Asked whether the Quakers were seen as religious or secular actors, Arnold Smith replied, "I think people who knew them understood that their motivation was spiritual. But spiritual is not an opposite to secular, it's an attitude of values, of how you deal in secular matters."[98] The Quakers would surely endorse this view.

Perhaps with an eye to encouraging a broader interest in conciliation work, Adam Curle has suggested that there is no such thing as a Quaker approach to peacemaking:

> There is an approach based on an understanding of fears, hopes, greeds, prides, confusions, loves, hatreds, guilts, the projections of inner demons; and a strong motivation to clear up the mess these things produce. However, there is nothing specifically Quaker, or even religious, about this; any decent humanist would do and want the same.[99]

While it is probably quite true that the Quakers are not *uniquely* qualified to do conciliation of this sort, it could at the same time be argued that, as Quakers, these men were particularly well equipped spiritually for the practice of conciliation. Others might well look to their example in seeking to understand—and perhaps approximate—the sensitivities, the stamina, the humility, and the caring and respect for others required for this type of work.

Certainly the Quakers' own deep spiritual convictions about "that of God in every one" and the power of nonviolence underpinned their commitment and fortified them to endure the dangers, hardships, tensions, tedium (at times), and disappointments that were integral to this peacemaking effort, along with its accomplishments. Although it is possible to conceptualize a purely secular form of conciliation practice, it would be a mistake in the case of the Quakers to try to separate the secular from the spiritual or to assume that the same results could have been accomplished by individuals operating from a totally secular perspective.

It is difficult to reach conclusions about the efficacy of a peacemaking effort in a conflict in which peace was not achieved short of total surrender. (One cannot help but wonder, however, whether a negotiated peace in this war, given the personalities involved, could have possibly equaled the magnanimity expressed and reconciliation achieved in victory and defeat.) Nonetheless, some conclusions can be reached about the accomplishments of the Quaker mission.

The Quaker team was the sole third party that won the complete trust of both parties in the conflict, and they sustained that trust for the duration of the war. Although the Quakers insisted on being completely open about their movements, they also proved that they could be trusted with sensitive information, including the personal disappointments and fears of men in power. Their nonpolitical base of operation and their powerlessness were also ingredients in their acceptance. With nothing to gain denominationally or professionally, they were believed to be sincere in their desire to help relieve the suffering on all sides.

By their presence and availability at critical moments, the Quakers succeeded in opening lines of communication that would have otherwise remained closed. Although they were not the only intermediaries carrying messages in the Nigerian civil war, it cannot be assumed that had the Quakers not been present, an alternative emissary would have been available in every instance to perform this service. This conclusion is particularly justified given that every other intermediary who came forward was considered to be biased by one side or the other.

The Quakers had a hand in bringing about the formal peace talks that occurred by urging the Biafrans to the table. Given Ojukwu's skittishness about negotiations—particularly those mediated by third parties seen as partial to the Nigerian side—the Quaker encouragement appears to have been particularly influential. (At the same time, given the international pressures on both sides to appear reasonable and willing to negotiate, it may not have been decisive).

Finally, insofar as the Quaker conciliators had a hand in sensitizing federal officials to the genuine fears of the Biafran people and in legitimizing Gowon's stand against occupation and retribution, they might also have had a hand, however indefinable, in winning the extraordinary peace that prevailed in postwar Nigeria.[100]

Notes

1. The principal sources relied on for the history of the Nigerian civil war were John de St. Jorre, *The Nigerian Civil War* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1972); and John J. Stremlau, *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War 1967–1970* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).

2. For a discussion of this period, see de St. Jorre, *Nigerian Civil War,* 30–64.

3. Interview with Yakubu Gowon, London, July 9, 1991.

4. De St. Jorre, *Nigerian Civil War,* 86. This is an estimate; no casualty counts were kept. De St. Jorre uses the figure of 10,000 for the total number of Easterners killed in 1966 in the disturbances of May, during the July coup, and in the September–October massacres.

5. Ibid., 87.

6. In an effort to stabilize the situation after the July coup, representatives of the regional military governors and Gowon had agreed on August 9 to order all soldiers back to their respective regions of origin. Gowon did keep federal troops of mainly Northerners in the Western Region and Lagos, however—a bone of contention with the West—until the time when their numbers could be replaced by Westerners.

7. De St. Jorre, *Nigerian Civil War,* 412 n.1.

8. This section's overview of the Quaker involvement is drawn from C. H. Mike Yarrow, *Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978), 188–96.

9. Launched in 1952 and extending through the 1970s, Quaker conferences for diplomats brought together young foreign service officers from different countries to discuss issues of current interest in international politics.

10. Yarrow, *Quaker Experiences,* 194.

11. In 1948, when Edwin Ogbu was a young college student in Florida, a Quaker woman (whose surname happened to be Friend) arranged a summer job for him. "I shall remain eternally grateful for that. . . . When they [Volkmar and Curle] introduced themselves as Quakers, I felt I should do the best I could" (interview with Edwin Ogbu, Lagos, August 9, 1991).

12. Interview with Gowon. Such was the case as well with the Oxford-educated Ojukwu (interview with Emeka Ojukwu, Lagos, July 17, 1991). Another Biafran leader, Commissioner of Commerce and Industry Sylvanus Cookey, had known some Quakers when he was a graduate student in London (interview with Sylvanus Cookey, Port Harcourt, Nigeria, July 23, 1991).

13. Federal officials refused to use the name *Biafra* during the war, referring instead to the "rebel enclave" or the "secessionist area." At some point after the war it became permissible, apparently well into the 1970s, to make reference to "the former Biafra" or to Ojukwu as the "Biafran rebel leader" (interview with Hamzat Ahmadu, Washington, D.C., April 25, 1991). Most of the former federal officials interviewed for this study, however, still did not utter the name of the breakaway republic.

14. In the closing months of the civil war, Curle, Volkmar, and Martin were assisted in their conciliation efforts by Kale Williams, head of the Quaker relief mission in Nigeria.

15. Yarrow, *Quaker Experiences,* 219.

16. Adam Curle, *Tools for Transformation: A Personal Study* (Stroud, U.K.: Hawthorn Press, 1990), 61 (emphasis in original). Curle goes on to explain that if there were not some desire for peace on both sides, they would not tolerate the involvement of mediators, who would "simply be a nuisance who confused the scene."

17. Adam Curle, *Making Peace* (London: Tavistock, 1971), 177.

18. Interview with Adam Curle, London, July 8, 1991.

19. Curle, *Making Peace,* 177.

20. Adam Curle, *True Justice: Quaker Peace Makers and Peace Making* (London: Quaker Home Service, 1981), 5.

21. Interview with Curle.

22. Curle, *Tools for Transformation,* 50–51.

23. Ibid., 63.

24. Ibid., 54.

25. Ibid., 55.

26. Yarrow, *Quaker Experiences,* 221

27. Interview with Cookey.

28. Interview with Allison Ayida, former permanent secretary, Ministry of Economic Development, Lagos, July 30, 1991. Gowon comes from the ethnically and religiously mixed Middle Belt region of the North. His father was an evangelist with the Christian Missionary Society for a time in the 1930s, and Gowon himself speaks appreciatively of the kindness of the missionaries and the quality of the primary school education he received at the mission school. A devout Christian, Gowon tells of being guided by prayer in his choice of a career. As head of state he composed a prayer that hung in the council hall of the Supreme Military Council. It asked for God's guidance in the council's deliberations, so that whatever decisions were taken would be motivated by love, rather than hatred and enmity, and would be in the interest of Nigeria and mankind (interview with Gowon; also interview with Sir David Hunt, British high commissioner to Nigeria during the early part of the civil war, Lindfield, West Sussex, U.K., July 4, 1991).

29. Telephone interview with John Volkmar, November 13, 1991.

30. Telephone interview with Haldore Hanson, December 13, 1991. A Lagos-based program officer with the Ford Foundation, Hanson financed most of the Quaker travel for the Nigerian mission with allocations from his discretionary fund. "Of all the discretionary grants I gave," he recalls, "this one I had more sentiment about."

31. See Stremlau, *International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War,* for the most thorough treatment of the many peacemaking efforts. See also Arnold Smith's personal documents and diaries, Leeds University Library Archives, Leeds, U.K.; Arnold Smith with Clyde Sanger, *Stitches in Time: The Commonwealth in World Politics* (Don Mills, Ontario: General Publishing, 1981), 76–105; and Yarrow, *Quaker Experiences.* The list of intermediary efforts compiled from these sources (though not necessarily exhaustive) includes the following. *African leaders*: President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon; Ghanaian Head of State General Joseph Ankrah; Prime Minister Kofi Busia of Ghana; President Hamani Diori of Niger; President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo; President Houphouet-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire; President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia; President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya; President Joseph Mobutu of Congo/Zaire; President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania; President Milton Obote of Uganda; Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia; President Leopold Senghor of Senegal; Prime Minister Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone; President William Tubman of Liberia; and Foreign Minister Emile Zinsou of Dahomey/Benin. *British and American officials*: British Undersecretary of State Maurice Foley; Malcolm MacDonald, British roving ambassador in Africa; Minister of State Lord Malcolm Shepherd, British Commonwealth Office; British Prime Minister Harold Wilson; New York Senator Charles Goodell; and U.S. Representative Charles Diggs. *International, regional, and subregional organizations*: the Commonwealth, Conseil de l'Entente, East African Community, Organisation Commune Africaine et Malagache, Organization of African Unity, and United Nations. *Religious figures and organizations*, in addition to the Quakers:

E. L. Johnson, secretary for overseas missions, Presbyterian Church of Canada; Pope Paul; Vatican envoys Monsignors Conway and Rochau; and the World Council of Churches. *Academics*: Oxford historian and Africanist Dame Margery Perham and Harvard Professor Roger Fisher.

32. See Smith, *Stitches in Time*, 76-105. Smith colleagues who were active in the secretariat's efforts included Assistant Secretary-General Hugh Springer; Assistant Secretary-General Yaw Adu; Special Assistant Emeka Anyaoku; Assistant Under-Secretary Eric Norris; and staff member Gerald Hensley. Together with Smith or independently they participated in meetings with the parties and traveled to the region on Commonwealth business or on "scouting missions," as in the case of trips made by Adu, a Ghanaian, to Ghana and Lagos before the war, and Anyaoku, an Ibo from Eastern Nigeria, to meet with Ojukwu as tensions were mounting prior to secession.

33. Reports to Smith from Assistant Secretary-General Yaw Adu, dated March 30, 1967, and April 17, 1967, Leeds University Library archives.

34. Smith diary entry dated April 2, 1967, Leeds University Library archives.

35. Smith, *Stitches in Time*, 83–85.

36. Ibid., 87–88.

37. Ibid., 87–88.

38. Ibid., 88.

39. Yarrow, *Quaker Experiences*, 204.

40. This point, suggested in ibid., was confirmed by Ignatius Kogbara, London representative for Biafra, who said that the Quakers' greatest contribution "was persuading us to go to the peace conferences" (interview with Ignatius Kogbara, Port Harcourt, Nigeria, July 23, 1991).

41. Letter from the secretary, International Affairs Division, May 23, 1968, American Friends Service Committee archives, as quoted in Yarrow, *Quaker Experiences*, 204–5.

42. Letter from Kampala, June 1, 1968, American Friends Service Committee archives, as quoted in ibid., 256.

43. Smith, *Stitches in Time*, 99.

44. Ibid.

45. Stremlau, *International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War*, 146. In arriving at this conclusion, Stremlau cites two documents: Republic of Biafra, "Commonwealth Peace Moves," a confidential memorandum prepared by the Directorate of Propaganda, March 1968; and an authoritative analysis by Adamu Ciroma, "Arnold Smith and Prospects for Peace in Nigeria," *New Nigerian* (February 17, 1968). Curle also was of the impression that Smith was never completely trusted by the Biafrans. He notes that Smith made the mistake in Kampala of staying in the same hotel as the Nigerians. Curle and his wife stayed in a hotel where there were no delegations (personal communication, November 1, 1991).

46. See Stremlau, *International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War*, 184–213.

47. Stremlau (ibid., 201) points out that Ojukwu's speech contained "no hint of compromise on the basic issue of secession." A preliminary assessment of the talks made by a member of the Nigerian delegation in a cable to Lagos indicated that Ojukwu's speech was taken as evidence that the Biafran leader continued to believe that foreign intervention would save his regime. It described the conference as "virtually over."

48. Yarrow, *Quaker Experiences*, 208.

49. Ibid., 209.

50. Ibid., 209–10.

51. Ibid., 210–11.

52. Interview with Ahmadu. He recalls that "any religious person who came before me in those days—particularly somebody who was a religious person but was prepared to listen—I was prepared to talk to, to knock down the myth."

53. In any case, except for the Commonwealth-sponsored talks at Kampala, the federal government generally insisted that any negotiations occur within the OAU framework affirming the territorial integrity of Nigeria, rather than experimenting with free-lance efforts. Such was the case, for example, when Pope Paul sought to mediate the conflict in August 1969 (see Stremlau, *International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War*, 343–45).

54. Yarrow, *Quaker Experiences*, 251-2.

55. See de St. Jorre, *Nigerian Civil War*, 284-87.

56. Stremlau, *International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War*, 296, 367. The International Observer Team of Nigeria was composed of representatives from Canada, Sweden, Poland, and the United Kingdom. Created by the federal government in August 1968, it served in the Ibo-populated areas for 16 months and filed numerous reports on its investigations.

57. See Stremlau, *International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War*, 292–300. The government of British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, for example, endured intense public hostility to its outright sale of arms and ammunition to Nigeria. The five Nordic countries—Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland—resisted public pressures for political action but gave strong support for humanitarian activities. The Low Countries—Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands—resisted pressures for recognition of Biafra, although, for a time during summer 1968, the Belgian and Dutch governments suspended arms shipments to Nigeria. The governments of Italy, Switzerland, and Germany had refrained from selling arms to either side from the beginning of the war. The United States also opted for humanitarian aid in lieu of political action. Many of these countries eventually voiced support for the OAU as the appropriate forum for finding a solution to the Nigerian problem.

58. On July 31, 1968, French President Charles de Gaulle issued a statement that the Biafrans had "demonstrated their will to assert themselves as a people" and that the conflict "must be resolved on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination" (*Le Monde*, August 1, 1968, as quoted in Stremlau, *International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War*, 227). This was acknowledged later by the French government to be "a certain recognition," if not a full diplomatic recognition of Biafra.

59. The African recognitions, which came in the five weeks prior to the first set of formal peace talks in Kampala, were primarily intended to strengthen Biafra's bargaining position in the interest of hastening a cease-fire and a negotiated end to the war (see Smith, *Stitches in Time*, 100). The reasons for French support were more complex and are discussed at length in Stremlau, *International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War*, 224–33. Ultimately, according to Stremlau's analysis, de Gaulle appears to have "inclined to the argument that France's long-term interests and those of her former West African colonies would be best served if Biafra were allowed to sustain a war of attrition long enough to force a political settlement. Such a compromise solution would, conceivably, reduce the likelihood that the new Nigeria would enjoy the internal strength necessary if she ever wished to dominate West Africa" (ibid., 229). Stremlau cites Stanley Diamond (*New York Review of Books*, February 26, 1970) as claiming that in the last year of the war, French arms rose from only 10 percent of the arms received from abroad to about half of the foreign total.

60. Interview with Gowon.

61. Stremlau, *International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War*, 360.

62. Ibid., 142.

63. Ibid., 142–43.
64. Ibid., 143–44.
65. Ibid., 144.
66. Ibid., 364.
67. Interview with Ogbu.
68. Smith, *Stitches in Time*, 79.
69. Ibid., 100. Smith writes that Dr. Michael Okpara, a former top political adviser to Ojukwu, confirmed Azikiwe's analysis of Ojukwu's character during a visit with Smith in England after the war (1972). Okpara said that Ojukwu was essentially an "all or nothing" man who would instinctively shift away from any compromise settlement.
70. Stremlau, *International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War*, 361. Another prominent Biafran who renounced his support for secession was Raph Uwechue, the Biafran representative in Paris. In September 1968, Uwechue told John Volkmar that he and several other Biafran leaders living abroad had recommended to Ojukwu that he give up secession in exchange for terms that would guarantee the security of the Ibo people. Ordered back to Biafra by Ojukwu, Uwechue telexed his refusal and said, in essence, that Ojukwu was immoral in continuing the war. Uwechue resigned his Paris post and subsequently published a book proposing peace terms (Yarrow, *Quaker Experiences*, 218).
71. Telephone interview with Gowon, January 14, 1992.
72. Interview with Ahmadu.
73. MEA, Summary Record of the Plenary Debate of the Nigeria Question During the Sixth Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, September 10, 1969, as recounted in Stremlau, *International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War*, 353–54.
74. Interview with Joseph Iyalla, Lagos, July 18, 1991.
75. Ibid.
76. Interview with Gowon.
77. Interview with Ahmadu. Ahmadu had developed a particularly close rapport with John Volkmar. He described how Volkmar "used to come to my home in the night—he'd knock on the door—not at the office very often." The last round of Quaker conciliation activity in the war, from September to November 1969, was prompted by Ahmadu in a meeting with Quaker relief official Kale Williams, whom he told: "If John thinks it would be useful to sample the political climate on both sides, we would be glad to talk with him." Nine days later, Volkmar and Curle were back in Lagos and preparing for a meeting with Gowon (Yarrow, *Quaker Experiences*, 231).
78. Interview with Ojukwu.
79. Ibid.
80. Interview with Ahmadu. Sir David Hunt, British high commissioner to Nigeria during the early part of the civil war, also stressed this aspect of the Quaker approach: "They were not looking for kudos for themselves. Instead they would oil the wheels, get something going, and then slip out without claiming the credit" (interview with Hunt). Both sides had been stung by undue publicity given to third-party efforts. Perhaps the most striking example was the case of Lord Shepherd, the British minister of state. Shepherd made three trips to Nigeria during the war, principally to seek federal concessions that would alleviate public opposition to the Labour government's Nigeria policy. In September 1968, Shepherd was approached by Biafran leaders in Europe who sought negotiations in the context of "one Nigeria." Shepherd went public with the announcement that Biafra was ready to talk of surrender, a move that infuriated the Biafrans and ended the peace overture (Yarrow, *Quaker Experiences*, 217).

81. Interview with Gowon.
82. Interview with Ayida.
83. Air travel into Biafra became quite harrowing after the coastal city of Port Harcourt, with its airport, was taken by federal forces in May 1968. A trip made by Curle and Martin into the rebel enclave in September 1968 is illustrative. Their first flight out of the then-Portuguese territory of São Tome was turned back because of engine trouble. The second flight managed to get up to 18,000 feet to avoid antiaircraft fire; it then descended by a steep spiral to land on the Uli airstrip, an enlarged roadbed, which was only lighted briefly for the final seconds of the landing (Yarrow, *Quaker Experiences*, 213).
84. At a March 1968 meeting with Curle and Martin, Gowon said "he was deeply touched by their willingness to risk their lives and by their diligence in coming back to see him, something other mediating groups had failed to do" (ibid., 200).
85. In one instance, a World Council of Churches delegation, which was sent to Biafra on an ecclesiastical mission, was surprised at being received as "official guests" of the Biafran government. They reported that they were "embarrassed by the amount of press publicity that attended our visit" and that they had been "dragooned" into a television interview that generated press reports "distorted beyond recognition" (report of the Reverend B. T. Molander and Mr. Geoffrey Murray as a delegation from the World Council of Churches to the Christian Council in Biafra, March 22–29, 1968, as quoted in Stremlau, *International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War*, 124).
86. Yarrow, *Quaker Experiences*, 200.
87. Interview with Ojukwu.
88. Telephone interview with Arnold Smith, November 13, 1991. One person who advocated a more hard-line approach to the defeated Biafrans was Joseph Garba, former commander of the Brigade of Guards in the Nigerian Army. Garba felt the top Biafran leaders should have been tried and punished: "We needed to demonstrate to our country people that it doesn't pay to pick up arms against one's brothers" (interview with Jospeh Garba, Jos, Nigeria, August 3, 1991).
89. Telephone interview with Volkmar.
90. Telephone interview with Smith.
91. Interview with Kogbara.
92. Ibid.
93. Interview with Ayida.
94. Interview with Kogbara.
95. Telephone interview with Smith.
96. Yarrow, *Quaker Experiences*, 180.
97. The third member of the Nigeria conciliation team, Walter Martin, is deceased.
98. Interviews, respectively, with Kogbara, Gowon, Ojukwu, and Smith.
99. Personal communication from Curle, October 10, 1990.
100. In addition to the interviews already cited, other individuals interviewed for this study (with titles from the civil war period) were the following. *Federal Republic of Nigeria*: Ukpabi Asika, administrator, East Central State. *Republic of Biafra*: N.U. Akpan, chief secretary to the military government; Okoi Arikpo, commissioner of external affairs; Matthew Mbu, foreign minister; Okokon Ndem, "voice" of Radio Biafra; Godwin S. Onyegbula, joint secretary to the government and permanent secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is regrettable that four of the Biafran officials who had the most frequent and closest contact with the Quakers are now deceased. They are Kenneth Dike, head of the Biafran mission in Abidjan; Sir Louis Mbanefo, chief justice and head of the Biafran delegation to the Kampala talks; Eni Njoku, former vice chancellor of the University of

Nigeria at Nsukka and head of the Biafran delegation to the Addis Ababa talks; and Michael Okpara, former premier of the Eastern Region and political adviser to the head of state. A fifth former Biafran official who would likely have been able to comment on the Quaker role was the late C. C. Mojekwu, commissioner of home affairs and a top adviser to Ojukwu. The sons of two of these men, Emeka Dike and Louis Mbanefo, Jr., were consulted, but they were unaware of the Quaker involvement. Also interviewed was J. Isawa Elaigwu, author of *Gowon: The Biography of a Soldier-Statesman* (Ibadan, Nigeria: West Books, 1986).

7 ▪

At the Front Lines of the Revolution: East Germany's Churches Give Sanctuary and Succor to the Purveyors of Change

DAVID STEELE

The Berlin Wall was intended to cement the division of Germany into East and West. Throughout the Cold War, as East Germany struggled to maintain a separate identity, its citizens watched their brethren across the wall develop one of the world's premier democracies. The advent of Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika* in the mid-1980s, however, raised hopes that the freedom and prosperity of the West might one day be replicated in the East. Theoretically, atheism, as a major tenet of communism, should have rendered religion obsolete in the Eastern bloc. Instead, the churches in East Germany not only flourished in their own right but were positioned to play a critical role in the revolution to come.

On Monday, October 9, 1989, stores closed at noon and school teachers advised children to stay away from Leipzig city center. Fears of a Tiananmen-like massacre spread, as doctors and hospitals were told to prepare for a large number of casualties. Leipzig was like an occupied city: army units gathered on its outskirts, and several thousand armed police took up positions outside downtown churches, especially around *Nikolaikirche* ("St. Nicholas' Church"), which was occupied by several hundred members of the Socialist Unity Party (SED, communist), commissioned by the Stasi (state security forces). The numbers of SED were soon overwhelmed, however, by the 10,000 people who gathered for weekly prayer services in the five churches holding worship and protest events that evening in the city center.[1]

Inside the churches a spirit of prayer pervaded, according to Pastor Ulrich Seidel. The beatitudes were read, protest songs were sung (including some from the American civil rights movement), and sermons were preached calling for nonviolent resistance and renunciation of any use of force by all sides.[2] When all the churches emptied and the people joined those waiting outside, candles symbolizing nonviolence and leaflets advocating it were distributed among a crowd that swelled to 70,000 by the end of the evening.[3] The only disruptive incident

10 ▪

Transition From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: The Role of Religious Actors

RON KRAYBILL

QUAKER SECTIONS
PP. 233 – 284

As African states, one by one, broke free from the shackles of colonialism, black Rhodesia's quest for self-rule encountered an entrenched white establishment. Ian Smith, the stubborn and resourceful leader of the heavily outnumbered whites, unilaterally declared Rhodesia independent of Britain in 1965, effectively tightening the grip of white control. Sanctions by Britain and the United Nations followed, while internally a guerrilla campaign was waged against the government by competing African nationalist factions. The struggle left the nation with a war-ravaged infrastructure, a fragmented opposition, and little hope for a peaceful solution.

Rhodesia[1] in 1979 was a nightmare. By the estimates of some, 20,000 people, many of them civilians, had already died in a costly war for liberation now frozen in a deadly stalemate.[2] The issue, at first glance at any rate, was simple. Black Africans, numbering nearly 90 percent of the population, wanted majority rule from a government clinging at all cost to white control and privilege.

The future, without a doubt, belonged to Africa. Old-style colonialism teetered on the brink of its own grave; England, formally Rhodesia's ruler,[3] chafed to complete the painful process begun more than 20 years earlier of shedding its ill-acquired African colonies. Neighboring Zambia had been independent since 1964, Botswana since 1966. Two other regional neighbors, Angola and Mozambique, had just gained their independence from Portugal in 1975 (see Figure 10.1). Rhodesia was the obvious next candidate to bear the torch of African nationalism. Oddly enough, even South Africa, long a backer of Salisbury's war efforts, had in 1976 begun withdrawing financial support and pressuring for reform.[4]

Within Rhodesia, the forces of liberation held the upper hand, as well. After 14 years of warfare, guerrilla troops now roamed large areas of the country and maintained a steady barrage of attacks on white farms, government offices, and outlying security establishments. The economy lay in ruins from heavy military expenditures and 13 years of economic sanctions by the outside world. Emotionally, whites were exhausted by the war. Not only had they lost sons in the fighting, they



Figure 10.1. Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

had lost faith in their future. Thousands had already fled to South Africa and elsewhere; many more contemplated leaving as well. The question in 1979 was not *if* black Africans would gain their rightful place in the nation, but *when*.

The discouraging part for the majority of Rhodesians was that the experience of the last decade suggested the moment of true African rule might still be a long and costly way off. Salisbury was on the defensive militarily, economically, and politically, but it still possessed a deadly modern military machine and the will, evidently, to use it for a long time to come. Not only had Prime Minister Ian Smith earned a reputation for being bull-headed, he had proven cunning at political maneuvering in the ancient method of "salami-style" negotiation. When stonewall and steel failed to contain the forces seeking to snatch the prize he held, Smith

more than once yielded. It was a stingy slice of political power he offered to Bishop Abel Muzorewa and two other blacks in the 1978 Internal Settlement, but it gave what he doubtless sought: deep division in the camp of African nationalists and a black leader willing to go to Washington and London in defense of a government still controlled by whites.[5]

Meanwhile, as usual in war, it was the civilians who suffered the most. One in six black Rhodesians had been displaced by the war; one in 10 lived in forced government resettlement camps where they were vulnerable not only to diseases but also to harassment by hostile government forces.[6] Many thousands more lived in refugee camps in the bordering states of Mozambique, Botswana, and Zambia.[7] Agriculture proved difficult and in many places impossible, leading to widespread hunger and impoverishment. Even worse for many was the calamity of getting caught in the crossfire of a vicious war. As control of territory changes constantly in guerrilla warfare, "neutrality" on the part of civilians offers the only means of survival. But as thousands of unfortunate victims discovered, neutrality is a difficult act to maintain. Killings, torture, rape, and pillage became commonplace for villagers.

If Rhodesia was a nightmare for its citizens, it was also a graveyard of failed peace initiatives. Between 1966 and the end of 1978, some 20 efforts had been launched, most involving governments outside Rhodesia in a brokering role. Some of the world's best-known politicians and mediators were involved. British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and his adviser, Lord Goodman, British Foreign Secretary David Owen, U. S. secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance, U.S. Ambassador Andrew Young, and Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda—all invested substantial efforts to secure peace in Rhodesia, and all failed.

But in September 1979, following a pivotal Commonwealth conference held two months earlier in Lusaka, Zambia, the impossible happened. Meeting in London at Lancaster House with the British Foreign Secretary Lord Peter Carrington as mediator, the warring parties negotiated for 13 weeks without a pause. Returning home just before Christmas, they carried to Salisbury the welcome news of a cease-fire, agreements on a transitional government, and settlement on a new constitution. For many Rhodesians, the possibility of genuine peace seemed incredible. Many thought whichever side lost in the elections slated for early in the new year would take to the battlefields again. General Peter Walls, commander of the Rhodesian Security Forces, was said to have a coup prepared in the event that the election turned against the white minority. The guerrilla forces of the Patriotic Front, led by nationalist leaders Robert Mugabe of ZANU and Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU,[8] were rumored to have kept men and weapons in reserve as well, outside the gathering points where the liberation armies were supposed to convene and lay down arms to a Commonwealth Monitoring Force of 1,500 men.

In February 1980, an independently monitored election was held, and ZANU leader Robert Mugabe won a clear majority. This was the outcome whites dreaded the most. Misled by the propaganda of Smith and Muzorewa, most had thought a Mugabe win highly unlikely; just in case he did win, however, many had packed

their cars in readiness to leave the country immediately.[9] Their fears were understandable—their government had long portrayed Mugabe as a bloodthirsty, atheistic communist. ZANU's actions had not helped, either. Just over a year previously, a "death list" had circulated from ZANU headquarters in Maputo, naming individuals with government connections for execution.[10] Though surely a minority, some young militants confided in later years that as the brutal war drew to a close, they were waiting with "pangas in hand to kill every white in sight" if the word were given.[11]

What the citizens of Rhodesia, soon to become Zimbabwe, experienced on Tuesday, March 4, 1980, shocked people in all camps. Lord Christopher Soames, the British representative charged with governing the country during the transition period, announced on Tuesday morning that Mugabe had won. Soon thereafter, Ian Smith made a public announcement indicating that he accepted the election results. What is more, he had met personally with Mugabe and found him to be a "reasonable man." Smith added that he intended to stay in the country and recommended that others do so as well.[12] That evening Mugabe, Grim Reaper of the guerrilla war, addressed the nation. Zimbabweans, he said, must now "beat their swords into plow shares . . . I urge you," he said, "whether you are black or white to join me in a new phase to forget our grave past. Forgive others and forget. Join hands in a new amity and work together, Zimbabweans."[13]

Arriving in London with duties completed several months later, Lord Soames groped for words to explain what was taking place in Zimbabwe. "Every time we thought the thing would explode in our faces, some miracle came about," he reflected. "When we went out there I was not one who believed in miracles. I think I am reversing my position now."[14]

Without a doubt, something remarkable took place in 1979–80. Although there were tragic exceptions in later years, a generally peaceful outcome was attained in a situation that looked dismal.[15] What is more, religious influence was pervasive, not only in the historical development of the country—Jesuits played a key role in the early colonizing efforts of the British in the late 1800s, and the Roman Catholic Church provided moral blessing for the status quo until well into the 1950s—but also during this period, including in the personal lives of many key leaders in the conflict.[16] At the grass-roots level, liberation fighters turned in large numbers to spirit mediums for guidance and protection during the war,[17] while thousands of Christians participated in special days of prayer during the time of the Lancaster House talks and subsequent elections.[18]

Not only were religious influences explicitly present at all levels in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe struggle, to an unusual degree religiously based peacemakers—virtually all Christian in orientation—were at work as well. Most prominent of these was the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, which, beginning in 1972, played an active role both within Rhodesia and internationally. Initially it functioned almost exclusively in the role of advocate, attacking the Salisbury regime for its abuses. But in 1978, as the war escalated and the suffering of civilians became intolerable, the commission, along with other Catholic agencies, mounted a global campaign to get the parties to the negotiating table.

Moral Re-Armament (MRA), a worldwide network of individuals committed to the concept of social and political change through personal transformation (see Chapter 4), was also extensively involved in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict from 1975 through 1980. MRA workers, in fact, arranged a final-hour, face-to-face meeting between Robert Mugabe and Ian Smith a day before the remarkable speeches of March 4, 1980. The spirit of reconciliation that astonished the world on that day is evidence, MRA workers believe, of the power of a spiritually-based approach to bring change.

Operating quietly from a London base, the Quakers were also deeply involved in negotiation efforts, plying skills grounded in a 300-year-old tradition of Christian pacifism and radical equality, and well-honed by several decades of nongovernmental peacemaking efforts. Like MRA, the Quakers had a team of workers present both at unsuccessful peace talks held in Geneva in 1976 and the 1979 Lancaster House negotiations. In between, Quaker teams made several trips to Africa, visiting government leaders in Salisbury, liberation leaders in Maputo and Lusaka, and leaders of the Frontline States,[19] seeking to get negotiations started.

THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

Largest, longest, and most complex of any religious response to the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict was that of the Roman Catholic Church (hereafter the Church). There is good reason for this: Jesuit missionaries were among the first white settlers in the 1890s, and in the first half of the twentieth century Catholics erected most of the country's infrastructure of schools and hospitals. By the time the liberation struggle had begun, the Catholic Church claimed the allegiance of nearly 10 percent of the populace, in a nation in which 25 percent of the people are reckoned as Christian.

Until the 1950s, the Church assumed an uncritical role as sanctifier of the white-dominated status quo. Archbishop Aston Chichester, who headed the Church from 1931 till the mid-1950s, captured the spirit of the era in his consecration speech, expressing appreciation for "the fine relationship that existed between the Church and the civil authorities, for both were striving for the welfare of the same people." At public functions, the archbishop was accorded a special seat next to the British governor-general.

The 1950s brought the African nationalist movement, and for the first time Catholic leaders were confronted with an articulate challenge from their own laity. In 1959 came the first major reaction by the Rhodesian state against the nationalist movement: the government declared a state of emergency, banned the fledgling African National Congress, and detained 500 of its members.

But it was white right-wingers who in the end shook the Catholic Church out of its lethargic role as cosmic umbrella for the white government. Ian Smith's Rhodesia Front came to power in 1962, and in 1965 they announced a Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Britain. One motivation for this was perhaps garden-variety aspiration to self-rule. But Smith was open about another goal: he would save whites from the horrors of Kenya and the Congo by halting any advance toward majority rule by Africans. As Smith implemented one piece of racist legislation after another, the Catholic bishops reacted, issuing a series of pastoral letters that publicly confronted Rhodesian Front policies.

The year 1969 marked the beginning of a new era for the Catholic Church in Rhodesia, and the entry point for this study, for in that year Smith sought powers to impose the absolute separation of races on all church institutions. The Catholic Church, along with some Protestant counterparts, openly disobeyed, threatening to close its vast network of schools and hospitals.[20] Church and state compromised in the end: the state agreed not to enforce the act, and the churches agreed to withdraw their opposition. But from this point onward the Catholic Church became a persistent and aggressive critic of the Salisbury government.

Truth-Telling to the Nation and the World

The primary role of the Catholic Church was that of "truth-telling"—conveying the reality of what was happening in Rhodesia to the nation and the world. The context was a battle the Salisbury government was fighting, not only in the field but also in the media. "The government propaganda machine was advertising, publicizing the atrocities of the guerrillas wholesale and never admitting any of their own atrocities or [that they were] doing anything wrong at all," recalls one Catholic worker.[21] Central in the Catholic response was a long-distance liaison between two Catholic institutions—the Commission for Justice and Peace (JPC), based in Salisbury, and the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), based in London.

The bishops of Rhodesia established the Commission for Justice and Peace in 1972 to institutionalize their commitment to racial justice.[22] Initially dominated by whites and perceived as an extension of the Church hierarchy, the JPC soon established a reputation in its own right that ultimately overshadowed all other institutions in the large network of Catholic hierarchies, orders, and missions active in the country.

Listening to Victims. The foundation of JPC activities, especially in its early years, was listening to the victims of the war. As news of the commission filtered out through the townships to the Tribal Trust Lands in the early 1970s, writes one Catholic historian, "Africans grew to see in it a major means at their disposal to speak of their oppression." Villagers trekked long distances to Salisbury to tell the commission of their plight. "Often there was no thought of redress, simply the quest for someone who would listen, see the wounds, and understand what was happening in the guerrilla war. It was strangely not so much a quest for justice and peace as a quest for truth. And it was ultimately truth, rather than justice and peace, that the Commission achieved and will be remembered for."[23]

Many rural Catholic missionaries throughout the war were intimately connected to the agony of the communities they served, as much and more so than members of the JPC staff and board who were mostly Salisbury-based. Priests and sisters were increasingly radicalized by the stories brought to them daily by parishioners, and

numbers of them openly sided with the liberation movements. The JPC relied heavily on this well-grounded and far-reaching "listening Church" (as it came to be known in contrast to the "teaching Church" based in traditional hierarchy) for access to the experiences of Africans in the townships and rural areas.

Confronting the State. Emboldened by the stories it was hearing, the JPC sent a Catholic delegation in March 1973 to Prime Minister Smith to "express concern over certain methods allegedly used by the Security Forces and the possible deterioration of race relations."[24] For a year the commission delayed further action, waiting for Smith and the minister of justice to act on the complaints of Security Force atrocities. When a second meeting with Smith in 1974 yielded no results, the commission began aggressively pursuing measures to bring the experiences of the people to whom they were listening into the public eye.

The JPC initially reached for domestic attention. In 1974 it provided documentation to a member of Parliament who called for an independent commission of inquiry into the conduct of the Security Forces. The JPC ran a large advertisement in the *Rhodesia Herald* supporting this call. It also compiled a dossier of Security Forces atrocities, which in an interdenominational "Appeal to Conscience" was sent to 500 prominent Rhodesians. The Catholic hierarchy backed up the appeal with a statement of its own.[25] Finally despairing of results at home, the JPC staff turned in 1975 to the outside world.

The London-Salisbury Connection. The JPC chose as its ally the London-based Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR). The fate of Rhodesia, after all, was subject to decisions in England, the legal ruler of the colony.[26] Thus, informing the British public and decisionmakers about the realities of Rhodesia became a critical aspect of the Catholic struggle against a racist regime. CIIR involvement on behalf of Rhodesia had begun in 1972, when it led an ecumenical justice for Rhodesia campaign. Over the next several years, the connection forged between Rhodesian Catholics and British policymakers via the JPC and CIIR proved pivotal, bringing events in Rhodesia "home to Whitehall, and the world, with a rapidity and accuracy that was acutely damaging to the image of the Rhodesian Front."[27]

In 1974 Smith escalated the war against the liberation armies. An aggressive counterinsurgency campaign moved villagers out of their home areas and sequestered them in centralized "protected villages." By the end of the year, 36 such camps existed, holding 70,000 people. These forced removals imposed enormous suffering on villagers. Occupants in many of the camps lived without water or sewage facilities and were unable to cultivate food. Catholics and Protestants organized relief—blankets, clothing, milk, and medical treatment.[28]

Publications. But the Catholics went beyond their Protestant counterparts. They published far and wide the ills they were treating. In May 1975, the CIIR published in London on behalf of the JPC *The Man in the Middle*, which described the plight of Rhodesian "protected" villagers. It also documented torture and

indiscriminate killing of villagers by the Rhodesian Security Forces. These accounts were widely published in British daily newspapers and stirred great controversy in Salisbury.[29] In November 1976, again through the CIIR, the JPC published *Civil War in Rhodesia*, a further dossier of brutalities by the Defence Forces. Even more than the earlier book, this work received extensive press coverage in Europe and Canada.[30]

With an eye to influencing an Anglo-American peace initiative under way at the time, in 1977 the JPC published *Rhodesia: The Propaganda War*. This paper further detailed the devastating impact of the protected villages, as well as the widespread use of torture by Rhodesian Security Forces and the misuse of security legislation by the Salisbury government. "We prepared the papers because we felt that when Andrew Young and David Owen met with the government they would only hear one side," recalls Sister Janice McLaughlin, a Catholic nun deeply involved in writing the document. "We knew we weren't being balanced. We were only giving one side very deliberately because the other side was quite well presented and distorted by the government."[31]

Efforts by the Salisbury government to counter the truth-telling efforts of the JPC and CIIR only increased the pressure. For several years the JPC had pursued the minister of law and order in court for conduct of the war. With procedural delays exhausted, the state in September 1975 enacted the Indemnity and Compensation Act, sheltering government employees from liability for actions committed in the war.[32] This amounted to a virtual carte blanche from the Rhodesian Front to its military personnel regarding conduct in the field. Given the widespread and well-documented abuses already taking place, this desperate response only underscored the moral vacuity of the Salisbury government. The measure was met with increased pressure from domestic and overseas critics.

Following the Internal Settlement in 1978, an ill-fated alliance between a desperate Ian Smith and a compromising Abel Muzorewa,[33] press censorship in Rhodesia tightened even further. The country was isolated from more than superficial scrutiny by the outside world. "Reliable information about life in the war zones and protected villages now came almost exclusively through Church channels, often deported missionaries and Church workers."[34]

Once again the link to London via the CIIR proved decisive. "We had something the press didn't have," recalls the director of the CIIR in London at the time. Through the JPC and the Catholic network in Rhodesia, CIIR had "access to the situation on the ground that was denied the media."[35] Several London newspapers reprinted information provided by the CIIR from Rhodesian sources. The JPC and CIIR also jointly published several documents critically assessing the Internal Settlement.[36] These reports circulated widely and succeeded in influencing many British members of Parliament and strengthening the hand of British Foreign Secretary David Owen and American U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young in their opposition to the Internal Settlement.

Joint International Lobbying Efforts. The JPC and CIIR cooperated in lobbying efforts as well. As early as April 1972, the CIIR arranged a meeting between

Rhodesian Bishop Donal Lamont, prominent scourge of the Salisbury regime,[37] and British politicians. These included Prime Minister Wilson, Foreign Minister James Callaghan, and several members of Parliament.[38] Between 1975 and 1979, there was a steady stream of Catholic delegations to London and other capitals. On a second trip in 1975, Lamont visited London, France, and Germany, where he met statesmen and lectured to large audiences. In the same year, the JPC hosted a visit to Rhodesia by the secretary-general of the International Commission of Jurists.[39] In 1978 and again in 1979, Catholic delegations traveled to London and Washington to caution against acceptance of the Internal Settlement and lifting of sanctions.[40] Additionally, the JPC mobilized a major international lobbying effort in 1979 (see p. 218) to pressure all parties to engage in negotiations.

Voice of Moral Conscience. The Church also sought to serve as a voice of moral conscience for the country. The Catholic bishops, often assisted by the JPC, released 10 pastoral statements between 1961 and 1980 calling for racial justice and, as the war escalated, for principled behavior on the part of the combatants.[41]

The thrust of the bishops' statements, as well as the JPC truth-telling campaign, was largely directed against the Rhodesian state, which did not take kindly to criticism from its most powerful religious constituent. The Catholic Church was a frequent target of attack in the press and Parliament, and Catholic workers were often harassed by the Security Forces. In February 1977, Salisbury deported the fiery Bishop Lamont, long the most outspoken of his brethren.[42] Between 1976 and 1980, 17 other Catholics were also deported.[43]

But Catholic structures addressed the liberation forces as well. In December 1976, the bishops publicly deplored guerrilla atrocities, and in the same month, during the Geneva talks, the JPC sent a private memorandum "To all the African Nationalist Leaders in Geneva." The letter expressed "grave concern about the apparently growing incidence of guerrilla atrocities," noting as an example that burial had been denied certain victims. The letter was received "with cold hostility" by members of the two liberation armies in Geneva.[44]

Later, during mediation efforts in 1978, the Catholic delegation again raised the issue with Mugabe and Nkomo of atrocities committed by liberation forces, and urged that special measures be undertaken to avoid harm to civilians.[45] On this occasion Mugabe admitted the occurrence of atrocities due to the difficulties of maintaining discipline over remote groups of guerrillas, stated his regret, and requested that the Church bring any future cases that arose to his attention.[46]

Advocate of Negotiations

Awareness of the massive scale of human suffering prompted a shift in emphasis in 1977 within the Commission for Justice and Peace, a shift that placed the JPC and the Catholic hierarchy in the new role of actively advocating for negotiations. "We decided that because the suffering was so great in the country, the suffering of all people, black and white, whether they deserved it or not . . . , our direction must now be toward actively searching for peace," recalls then-JPC Secretary Michael Auret.[47]

In December 1977, JPC staff sought to arrange a meeting involving representatives of the bishops and the JPC with the liberation organizations. The archbishop of Maputo and the apostolic delegate in Lusaka were contacted to explore such a meeting, but the initiative became mired in Church protocol.[48] In 1978 the JPC called upon the CIIR in London to initiate contacts with the two liberation movements. In July the bishops publicly added their weight to the effort by calling for all-party talks and offering their services "to do whatever we can to assist in the process of reconciliation." After weeks of effort, arrangements were finally made for a delegation to meet ZANU and ZAPU in their respective headquarters.

On August 13, 1978, a six-person delegation traveled to Lusaka, where they met with Nkomo and visited with Zambian President Kaunda.[49] Accompanied by Nkomo, they also visited Zimbabwe House, a resource center for exiles from Rhodesia, and refugee camps of black Rhodesians who had fled the war. A few days later the delegation met with Mugabe, who was traveling through Lusaka from talks in Nigeria.[50] With both leaders the delegation focused on the extent of the suffering in the country, and the primary message was "we must move toward peace."[51] The delegation made it clear that they would be conveying the same message to the internal leaders as well.

One result of these meetings was "to reinforce the commitment of the Commission to act as a force for reconciliation."[52] A series of meetings followed in quick succession. The delegation met in Salisbury with three leaders of the Internal Settlement government—Ndabaningi Sithole, Abel Muzorewa, and Chief J. S. Chirau—to explore the possibility of an all-party conference. The fourth leader, Ian Smith, refused to meet and sent instead Deputy Prime Minister David Smith.[53] They met as well with two top army commanders, Peter Walls and Sandy McLean, stressing the desperateness of the situation and urging that they use their influence with the government to end the war. In September 1978, two Catholic representatives traveled to London and met with Foreign Secretary Owen "to underline the gravity of the situation."[54]

In addition, as requested by the Patriotic Front leadership, the Church devoted greater attention "to the growing problem of refugees outside the country in camps in Mozambique, Botswana, and Zambia."[55] Mike Traber, a priest with many close friendships in top ZANU circles, went to Maputo and helped set up the Zimbabwe Project, which responded to the needs of Rhodesians fleeing the violence in their homeland. Traber also secured Mugabe's permission to place a Catholic worker in the camps of the ZANU forces.

But in the weeks after the meetings with the political leaders, the possibility of negotiations appeared more remote than ever. The Executive Committee of ZANU, whose army accounted for 85 percent of the guerrillas operating inside Rhodesia, refused to meet with Smith unless the British foreign secretary, legally the representative for Rhodesia, was also present.[56] What is more, long-simmering tensions between ZANU and ZAPU flared into the open at a meeting of the Frontline States in September. To make matters worse, while the Frontline States were still in

session, Nkomo's forces shot down a commercial Air Rhodesia Viscount aircraft and then slaughtered 10 of the 18 survivors on the ground. Government troops had in the past visited massacres on a far larger scale on Africans, of course. But the white reaction in Rhodesia and abroad was visceral horror.

The war continued to escalate. In October Rhodesian forces raided Nkomo's camps in Zambia, killing 1,500 people.[57] In addition to the government forces, there now roamed, virtually at will, private armies established by Muzorewa, Chirau, and Sithole. In some areas, five different sets of African militias fought for control.[58] As a direct result of the war, for the first time in recent memory, Rhodesians began dying from famine.

Meeting with the Pope. Despairing of results from efforts to work directly with the political leaders involved, the JPC shifted course and moved once again to the world stage in a truth-telling role. The goal: "to alert world opinion to the tragedy of an anarchic collapse into famine and increased bloodshed."[59]

Circumventing protocols that normally required six weeks' advance contact, staff at the Vatican arranged an urgent meeting with Pope John Paul II on a few days' notice in early April 1979.[60] Two Rhodesian bishops and a JPC staff member urged the prelate to use Vatican influence to pressure all parties to enter negotiations. The pope responded vigorously to their plea. Before the three left Rome, he had contacted diplomats in Italy, the United States, Britain, France, and Germany[61] and called in the British representative to the Vatican to urge British intervention in Rhodesia. Individuals from the trio followed up with personal visits to diplomats in Germany, Britain, and the United States and found in each case that the pope's contact had left a mark. The message to Western diplomats was the same as to parties themselves: the suffering must end. The goal of the lobbying was "pressure, more pressure on Smith, more pressure on the guerrilla forces to negotiate."[62]

In August 1979, the breakthrough came. At the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher encountered virtually unanimous opposition from the Commonwealth Nations to her oft-reiterated position of support for the Muzorewa government. Bowing to a consensus forged by the joint efforts of President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser of Australia, Thatcher agreed to reject the Internal Settlement government and to convene a constitutional convention under British auspices as soon as possible.

Lancaster House and the Transition Period. Catholics were in the background at Lancaster House and sought no direct role in the negotiations. But staff from the CIIR picked up their previous role as truth-teller and published five public briefing documents on key issues.[63] For their part the Bishops Conference issued a public appeal to all leaders "to put the good of the whole nation before personal or party interests, for the sake of the people's suffering."[64]

During the transition period between the Lancaster House settlement and the elections, the JPC and observers sent from CIIR in London used their intimate

knowledge of the country and access to key leaders to support the tenuous peace. Lord Soames, sent from England to serve as governor of the country until the election, held the unenviable task of maintaining order in a political tinderbox with a small Commonwealth Monitoring Force. Several bombings, multiple assassination attempts on the life of Mugabe, roving bands of armed men, and ceaseless rumors threatened to plunge the country at any moment into warfare. Soames relied in part on the corps of international observers present to inform his decisions. Lord Chitness and Eileen Sudworth, British observers sent by the CIIR, drew extensively on Church knowledge and resources in assisting other observers, providing transportation, arranging for observers to meet key people, and writing reports for the press.[65]

There were persistent reports of misconduct by armed men in the northern and eastern regions of Rhodesia. Soames had been told that Mugabe's army was responsible, and he threatened several times to take action against them. But from their extensive networks, Catholic observers knew that the perpetrators were not Mugabe's forces, but rather the auxiliary forces of Muzorewa. In what was perhaps the most assertive Catholic intervention, Archbishop Chakaipa took this information to Soames, who accepted it as credible and ended his criticism of Mugabe's army.[66]

Partisan and Victim Roles. At no time was it official Church policy to support the war effort of either side, but in reality large amounts of Catholic resources contributed to the support of both sides. Individuals and in some instances groups of Catholic workers actively supported the guerrilla cause. Some of the rural Catholic missions provided medicine, food, clothing, money, and rest to the guerrillas.[67] Notable here were the Burgos Fathers, a Spanish-based order still radicalized by their experience with the fascists in Spain, and with an emphasis on living simply in close connection to the people they served. Many in this order "actively supported the guerrillas and were positively hostile to the Security Forces."[68] One Catholic worker interviewed six amputees at random at a Red Cross unit in Maputo and discovered that all six ZANU-affiliated soldiers owed their lives to Catholic missionaries, each in a different incident.[69]

A minority of Catholic workers, on the other hand, openly supported the government. A substantial number of the Marianhill missionaries and some of the German Jesuits "saw the war as a struggle between the State and terrorism" and maintained friendly contacts with the Security Forces.[70] What is more, decades of coziness between church and state had established conventions of cooperation that the Church never challenged. The Catholic Church provided chaplains for the Security Forces throughout the war and never reciprocated with the guerrilla forces.[71] Though Lamont denounced the legitimacy of the state, neither he nor others in the hierarchy ever called for a boycott of payment of taxes. Catholic laypeople thus were a large and compliant source of funding of the war efforts of the Salisbury government throughout.[72]

Combatants on both sides of the conflict perceived the Church as partisan, and consequently Church workers and institutions suffered severely. The national

network of Catholic schools, missions, and hospitals put Catholic workers at great risk. Between December 1976 and February 1980, a total of 25 Catholic expatriate missionaries were killed, and 18 were deported.[73] Nineteen Catholic-run secondary schools and an even larger number of primary schools were closed as a result of harassment by guerrilla forces.[74] The Rhodesian Security Forces, of course, had been hostile from the early stages of Catholic opposition. Putting a gun behind one African priest's ear, a member of the Security Forces gave a command that seemed to capture a common attitude: "You black bastard, speak up. One dead missionary is better than one hundred dead terrorists."[75]

Summary. When it came to conversation with top-level leaders, the role that most frequently characterized Catholic responses was the voice of morality. Church representatives either stressed the immense scale of human suffering or they appealed for more humane conduct of the war by the fighting forces. Even the major effort in mid-1978 to get talks started was pitched at the level of moral concern. A delegation of six was sent, which in itself implied an intent to register a message with the parties rather than to attempt the more facilitative tasks of practical negotiation where one or two are quite enough to accomplish the purpose of the meeting. No effort was made to convey messages between parties or to draw the parties into the practical issues of "getting to the table." Similarly, in the 1979 effort, the JPC staff members made no effort to work through the parties. They went directly to outside pressure groups. In short, Catholics were lobbyists on behalf of moral concerns, not mediators.

Assessment of Catholic Involvement

Because the target audience of Catholic involvements was so vast—the entire public sphere in Rhodesia and concerned countries abroad—it would be impossible to measure the full impact of the Catholic efforts. But leaders in present-day Zimbabwe credit the Catholic Church for a major contribution. In 1980 President Robert Mugabe commented:

> I think the Catholic Church played a very significant role in the liberation struggle. Not that they fought with arms as we did, but they opposed racialism, and refused to be made an agent of the Government implementing racial policies. We valued the support which the Church gave us as it helped to internationalize our grievances and helped to mobilize international support for us. Within the country it gave us a broader base than the one which we ourselves, acting entirely on our own, could have created.[76]

Canaan Banana, the former president and preeminent historian of the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe struggle, concluded in a 1989 essay that the JPC "played an invaluable role of publicising and condemning the excesses of the Rhodesian army in its conduct of the war. In this way atrocities of the Rhodesian security forces were effectively disclosed and the psychological warfare counteracted."[77]

For the scholar of conflict resolution, the Catholic involvements are a remarkable study in the potential and limitations of a religious organization to contribute

to the resolution of a national conflict. The Church's roles as truth-teller, voice of moral conscience, and advocate of negotiations depended on each of several key attributes.

At the heart of the Catholic contribution lay a value system in which survival and power were not the ultimate goal, but rather faithfulness to transcendent values that included justice, truthfulness, and service to others. These values led Catholic workers to enter into engagement with victims of the war, and only as a result of this engagement were Catholic workers able to see and act on the issues destroying the people of Rhodesia. But Catholics did not merely see the issues; their far-flung church system provided an unparalleled information-gathering network, making it possible to compile information essential for mobilizing domestic and world opinion. When it came to influencing decisionmakers, the Catholic efforts depended on an international structure for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information and ready entrée to political figures and media channels, domestically and abroad.

With the possible exception of the first, none of these attributes is "religious" per se, but in Rhodesia, the Catholic Church was the only institution that embodied all of them. In this regard, the case study illustrates the Church at her best potential for peacemaking.

A fundamental part of the problem in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe struggle was the apathy of the white ruling elite to the injustices of their own government. Like ruling elites elsewhere, they believed their own government's propaganda. Rhodesia thus demonstrated a generic problem: the opiate of patriotism makes it harder for citizens to see the moral issues at stake in national conflicts with the clarity available to those at a distance. The Catholic Church, like other white-led churches and institutions in Rhodesia, was for many years lethargic in the face of massive injustice. But two fundamental differences set Catholics apart from other churches:

1. Catholic ecclesiology supports a global rather than a national orientation by placing final fiscal, theological, and organizational authority in an extranational agency, the Vatican.
2. The worldwide Catholic Church was in the midst of a major renewal at every level in the aftermath of Vatican II, and one result of the renewal was an unprecedented commitment to supporting efforts to achieve structural justice. (See the Philippines case study, Chapter 8 in this volume.)

Consequently, the individuals within Rhodesian Catholic structures who challenged the injustice of their political system had access to a massive global structure that "leveraged" their efforts, even though they were a minority in their country and, initially at least, within their own church. At the individual level, Bishop Lamont and priests more radical than he were buoyed by the trends of the global Catholic Church in confronting the many in Catholic structures who supported Salisbury. At the institutional level, the Commission for Justice and Peace found a ready and powerful ally in the London-based Catholic Institute for International Relations long before many Rhodesian Catholics supported a position that, to blind patriots, looked subversive. To the extent, then, that injustice

imposed by ruling elites is part of a conflict—and surely it is in many national conflicts—the Catholic Church in Rhodesia demonstrates the potential of religious organizations to cut through the lethargy of blind patriotism to a genuinely moral basis of analysis and action.

On the other hand, the case also demonstrates the limits of a massive, institution-bound religious structure as a base of response to conflict. In Rhodesia the Church had for decades cultivated a cozy alliance with the state. In providing a "cosmic umbrella" for an unjust social and political structure, the Church stood culpable as a contributing cause of the war. As individuals and agencies within the Church finally began awakening to reality, they faced debilitating resistance from within the Church itself to confronting the actions of the state. Though the Church found her way in the end to outspoken resistance to white privilege, one must ask why it took so long. African nationalism was already rocking the Catholic boat in the early 1950s, but it was not until 1969 that the Catholic bishops disengaged themselves from the embrace of the state, and it was not until 1972 that they established the Commission for Justice and Peace as a structure for responding to the racial injustices that undergirded the society. Even then, these actions came only after much anguished debate, arousing enormous ambivalence among the bishops and great resistance within the Church.

Thus, if the global orientation and networking capacity of international Catholic structures proved an enormous asset in mobilizing a response to the Rhodesian conflict, the institutional inertia and patriotic bent of domestic Catholics nearly paralyzed the initial responses. It took many years for the Church to come to a point of sufficient clarity about its own moral position that it could begin mobilizing its far-flung resources effectively.

As will be seen in the case of the Quakers, the roles undertaken by the Catholic Church could perhaps have been undertaken by another actor. But no organization without a spiritual identity could have had an impact comparable to that of the Catholic Church. The point here is that it may not be the roles and responses per se that are the key to understanding what religiously based actors do. The key may lie instead in the *identity* of the religious actors and their resulting credibility in the eyes of the parties, as well as, in this case, in the power that the Catholic Church wielded to influence public opinion at home and abroad.

MORAL RE-ARMAMENT

Salisbury in February 1980 crackled with tension. Lancaster House had yielded a peace plan two months previously, but the real test of the settlement was now at hand. Elections had just taken place and, after several days of vote counting, the results were about to be announced. Rumors swirled about what each group planned to do if it lost. Whites were counting on Muzorewa to win the election and finally gain the recognition denied him in 1978 under the abortive Internal Settlement. But it was widely known that General Peter Walls of the Security

Forces had a coup prepared to intervene in the event that the election turned out differently than expected.

On the other hand, many had also heard, and believed, reports that Mugabe's guerrilla fighters were no longer in the agreed holding zones. The word was that they were quietly moving out in preparation for battle and were being replaced by *mujibas*, young, less-experienced guerrillas.[78] Cuban troops were said to be just over the border in Beira, Mozambique, with tanks and weapons, and the Nigerians allegedly had 19,000 troops waiting at airstrips in the event of a white takeover or South African intervention. At the request of the Rhodesians, South Africa had placed a small army unit on the Rhodesian side of Beitbridge. "Everybody had their contingency plans," recalls one Moral Re-Armament worker. "It appeared to us that whoever won the election, we were back into confrontation."[79]

A sober group of MRA workers—the Cabinet of Conscience, as they had come to call themselves—gathered on Saturday morning at the end of election week to assess the situation. The moment of truth was nearing, for on Tuesday the election results would be announced. The fate of the country, not to mention the lives and future of their families, seemed to hang in the balance. After lengthy discussion yielded no way forward, Joram Kucherera, a member of the group with personal and family connections to ZANU, stood and said he knew what must happen. "Two people have to meet—Smith and Mugabe. There's no other way."[80] Others doubted the possibility of such an event, but agreed it wouldn't hurt to try.

Kucherera, who had been laying the groundwork for such a meeting, contacted a cousin who was a senior aide to Mugabe. To his surprise, the response was positive. Kucherera then rang Alec Smith, son of the prime minister and key member of the MRA group. Over the last several years Alec had arranged numerous meetings between his father and individual nationalists, so the invitation to meet with Mugabe could hardly have come as a complete shock to the elder Smith.

Both sides were interested in a meeting, but wary.[81] The elder Smith insisted on meeting personally with Kucherera and sought clarification from the Mugabe side about the agenda before agreeing to the meeting. For their part, Mugabe and his top aides undertook a quick series of consultations with their allies: Mugabe flew to Dar es Salaam to consult with President Nyerere, and Kucherera himself was asked to meet at Mugabe's house with a representative of Mozambican President Samora Machel to gain that country's support.[82]

Though frightened by the thought that his bold venture to get the two leaders together could easily end in the loss of his own life, Kucherera felt he was undertaking a divine mission and made no secret of what he saw as the source of his inspiration. Told in an exploratory session that the idea of a meeting was a "thought from God," a skeptical Emmerson Munangagwa, Mugabe's head of security, shot back, "You think God fixes things like this? A meeting with Ian Smith?" But Mugabe himself saw no need to challenge Kucherera's assertion that "this country needs a miracle."[83] What Kucherera offered was something the Mugabe camp keenly sought—low-visibility access to Ian Smith via Kucherera's trusted friend, Alec. After several days of almost round-the-clock meetings, both sides gave their approval.

Two and a half days after the MRA group had met, the man who had squandered the lives of thousands and the economy of his nation to destroy Mugabe and his fellow African nationalists was driven by Kucherera in an aging Morris Minor automobile to ZANU headquarters. Accompanied only by Kucherera, Smith walked past 50 tense and heavily armed guards into the house. "Let's get rid of him now," shouted a brash young guerrilla, raising his rifle. A senior commander of the ZANU forces turned, and with the butt of his own weapon, sent the young man sprawling. Inside the house, Mugabe invited Smith to sit next to him on a couch, and for the next several hours, the two men talked about the future of the nation.

Both had been tipped off regarding the expected outcome of the election, so they entered the meeting aware that in less than 24 hours Mugabe would be announced the winner. In the meeting, Mugabe indicated that, as a civilian leader, he would approach things differently than he had as leader of a liberation army, and he outlined policies he intended to pursue. He stressed his eagerness to retain the confidence of whites and inquired from Smith what measures would be necessary to do so. Mugabe also put an offer on the table: Smith would be welcome to nominate two white ministers to serve in Mugabe's cabinet.

The following morning, Tuesday, March 4, came the public announcement of the election results followed by Smith's astonishingly positive response, encouraging fellow whites to stay. That evening Mugabe made his famous "reconciliation speech."[84] A few weeks later, with the political transition process nearing its completion, Prime Minister Mugabe reiterated the theme: "If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today I have become a friend and ally. If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love that binds you to me and me to you."[85]

MRA Beliefs

MRA has no creed or dogmas. God is assumed to exist and to be actively involved in implementing a just and loving masterplan for the world.[86] Beyond these fundamental assumptions, MRA workers and literature reflect little interest in prescribing "correct belief." The closest the organization comes to doctrine is a belief in "four absolute standards": honesty, purity, unselfishness, and love. To the extent that individuals apply these standards to their life, it is believed, they will find themselves and their relationships transformed. To the extent that leaders apply these standards to their personal and public lives, society will be transformed.

But what, specifically, does "absolute love" demand? Where ethicists write books in answer, MRA leaves the problem to the individual. Such a response could appear to be sheer abandonment, but MRA points to some assistance: the traditions of various religious faiths, the insights of others, and divine guidance. Recurrent in MRA literature is the call to "listen to God." God is in charge of the world, and any individual who listens will find that God speaks, giving guidance about what needs to be done. Active MRA workers and supporters typically spend at least 20 minutes each day alone in "quiet time," "listening" for "thoughts" about what to do. Often these thoughts are about individual actions to set aright one's own life and relationships, which MRA stresses as the place where genuine change of any kind must begin. But as one's own life comes aright, God will also prompt the individual with thoughts about actions needed to effect God's purposes in the world. The Mugabe-Smith meeting and the Reader-Chavunduka partnership (described later) are examples MRA workers would cite here.

MRA in Rhodesia

MRA was active in southern Africa from 1928 onward,[87] holding conferences and workshops in South Africa and Rhodesia. MRA workers in the 1970s were surprised to discover that numerous liberation front leaders, including Nkomo and Mugabe, already knew about the organization. Nkomo, like many black Africans, held positive views from his encounters with MRA in the 1950s, for MRA had already then challenged individual whites to change their racist attitudes. Mugabe had seen MRA films as a student and told an MRA worker in 1976 he respected the organization's concept of beginning with mending one's own ways as the key to healing relationships. But he held serious reservations. The idea "works in the family, and also in society," he said, but "it doesn't work in politics . . . They are the oppressors and we are the oppressed. If we change our attitude, nothing happens. We've tried it."[88]

After influencing the lives of thousands of young people in southern Africa in the 1940s and 1950s, MRA faded. By 1970 activities in Rhodesia had dwindled to personal visits by a handful of retirees. "My first contact with MRA was at a quaint old house in Salisbury and nobody in the room was under 75 years old," recalls Alec Smith, a key figure in the revival of MRA in Rhodesia. But as Smith soon discovered, the MRA people possessed a major asset: they had "built up a network of friendships across society that laid the basis for everything [that followed]."[89]

Smith's involvement with the small and aging group of pensioners began in 1974 and led in a remarkably short time to the reactivation of MRA in Rhodesia. He was on the rebound himself from a decade of vintage 1960s-style rebellion. Alcohol and other drugs, partying, and dismissal from Rhodes University in South Africa all figured in a past of which Smith had now wearied. A few months prior to encountering MRA, he had experienced a profound personal religious conversion. Awakened for the first time to the painful realities of war-torn Rhodesia, he was convinced that God was able to bring about great change in the lives of human beings, and he was filled with a burning desire to carry this message to his own countryfolk. An MRA film about Dr. William Nkomo from Pretoria, the first president of the African National Congress Youth League in South Africa, had deeply impressed Smith. Nkomo was a committed MRA supporter who had overcome bitterness through his own experience of God, and who traveled widely in Europe and Africa, challenging audiences with fundamental MRA concepts: to begin living by absolute moral standards, to hand over control of their lives to God, and to listen to Him for guidance.[90]

Impressed by the Nkomo account and the MRA vision for rebuilding broken societies through individual renewal, Alec Smith took up an active role in MRA. Others were becoming active at the same time, including Sir Cyril Hatty, a former

government cabinet member, and Dr. Elliot Gabellah, vice-president of Rhodesia's African National Congress. Meeting regularly and groping for a way to reach their countrymen with a message they felt offered the only possibility of a peaceful future, the group decided to convene an international MRA conference in Salisbury.

The event, held in June 1975, drew more than 1,000 participants and laid the groundwork for MRA work in Rhodesia for the next five years. Among those present were four cabinet members from the Smith government, as well as a delegation from the opposition United African National Congress (UANC), whose leader, Bishop Muzorewa, was out of the country at the time but sent a message of support.[91] Several individuals who later numbered among MRA's most active workers encountered the organization for the first time at this conference.

One key relationship that resulted was a close friendship between Alec Smith and Arthur Kanodereka, an African nationalist. At the conference Smith spoke with deep feeling about fellow Rhodesians being driven in desperation to fight in the bush for liberation. "It's people like me who have sent them there," confessed the son of the prime minister before the whole assembly. "For my part, I am deeply sorry for the thoughtlessness of my past life and I have now committed myself to finding a solution for our country, to building bridges of reconciliation, and to showing the rest of Africa that black and white can live together. That, under God, there is an answer."[92]

Alec's speech stirred a response in Kanodereka, a Methodist minister who, deeply embittered by his experiences with whites, was now a recruiter of young men into the guerrilla forces. Kanodereka was touched by Smith's words and invited him to come to his church to speak. A friendship resulted, and the two began addressing audiences together on a regular basis. Kanodereka also began holding weekly meetings in his congregation to enable blacks and whites to dialogue together. On occasion, as many as 800 people attended at a time.

Smith and Kanodereka traveled widely in Rhodesia and to South Africa as well, offering, in classic MRA style, first-person accounts of their own experiences of the power of God to bring change and reconciliation. They challenged listeners to set aright their own lives in accordance with the four absolute standards as a first step toward finding God's plan for themselves and the nation. Until Kanodereka's assassination in December 1978,[93] the pair were by far the most visible in MRA activities in Rhodesia.

But a larger nucleus stood just behind them. At the heart of MRA activities between 1975 and 1980 was the group that came to be known as the Cabinet of Conscience. Meeting eight to 10 times a year for much of this period, the "Cabinet" served partly as a central strategy-planning group, partly as a place of encounter and dialogue for people of diverse backgrounds, and partly as a forum for confronting individuals with the call to change their own lives according to the four absolute standards.

The core group was small—less than a dozen.[94] They were also poorly balanced: they were more white than black, more reliably connected to government than to black nationalist circles, and better connected to Muzorewa and other

Internal Settlement leaders willing to strike a compromise with the Smith regime than to the leaders of ZANU and ZAPU.[95] But they were ambitious and deeply committed. They carried a message of reconciliation both challenging and hopeful at a time when the nation was weary of war. Perhaps most important, on a continent where personal relationships often transcend politics and ideology, they were tireless in cultivating friendships across the political spectrum.

As a result of all these factors, Moral Re-Armament was on the scene of most of the critical political events affecting Rhodesia between 1976 and 1980, and MRA workers interacted with many of the key players on the political stage over this time, in several cases at substantial depth. During this period, from four to eight people, more than half of them volunteers from England and Scotland, worked full-time for MRA in a variety of activities.[96]

Promoting Reconciliation Between Key Individuals. MRA teaches that individual change is the key to social change. Thus bringing individuals of diverse backgrounds together for face-to-face encounters formed the heart of MRA activities. MRA strategies to accomplish this were diverse and creative.

Providing the foundation for many of MRA's activities in Rhodesia was the MRA conference, an event refined through long MRA experience elsewhere to a unique blend of inspiration, admonition, and confession, all conveyed in the genre of the personal narrative. It was to such an event, the gathering described above, that Alec Smith and others turned in 1974 to put MRA "on the map." MRA workers in Rhodesia also took advantage of the large international MRA conferences, held every year in Caux, Switzerland, for bridge-building purposes of their own. Over the critical period 1975–79, MRA took delegations of 10 to 20 Rhodesians every year to Caux. In 1979, one such group spent a week in Caux before continuing on to London for the Lancaster House talks.

In addition to the large Caux gatherings, Rhodesians attended a shorter regional conference that took place every year in southern Africa. MRA workers held small workshops every few months in Rhodesia as well, seeking to apply MRA principles to family life, education, industrial relations, and so on.

Another innovative strategy for interpersonal encounter was dinner parties. Desmond Reader, a senior academic at the University of Rhodesia, was prompted during a morning "quiet time" to apologize to an African colleague for underestimating his abilities and underemploying him. Gordon Chavunduka, the man in question, responded warmly; his work and the relationship were transformed as a result. This experience brought the two men into deeper conversation, and they began working together on a series of lunches and dinner parties to bring together people who were, in Reader's words, "extreme opposites." Chavunduka was secretary-general of the African National Congress and thus had access to a variety of internal nationalist leaders. A dozen dinners or so were held in 1975–76, each involving perhaps 20 people. Among the guests were several members of Ian Smith's Cabinet and prominent African National Congress leaders.[97]

MRA also set up several one-on-one encounters among key leaders with the intent of destroying stereotypes and fostering new attitudes. The high-stakes,

eleventh-hour meeting between Mugabe and Smith, which opens this section, provides the most dramatic example of MRA's use of interpersonal encounters. But there were others, among them the following:

- Every six to eight months over a several-year period, MRA workers took people connected to political rivals of Ian Smith to visit the prime minister.[98] Usually these were arranged by Alec Smith. On two occasions, Alec Smith took his friend and MRA co-worker, Arthur Kanodereka, to have tea with his parents. These meetings, Alec felt, were a precedent for the elder Smith, who had previously never invited blacks on a social basis into his home. On the first occasion, after Kanodereka and his wife had departed, the prime minister thanked his son and commented: "If all black nationalists were like him, I'd have no trouble turning over the country tomorrow."[99]
- Kanodereka had a similar impact on Minister of Law and Order Hilary Squires. MRA arranged a meeting between the two in early 1976 in which Kanodereka, then treasurer of the UANC and thus a key leader in the internal nationalist camp, recounted his personal struggle with bitterness against whites. Squires was visibly impressed. "I've never seen such a change in a man's attitude in my life," recalls Tom Glenn, the MRA worker who arranged the meeting. Later that year during the Geneva Conference, Squires and Kanodereka held several additional meetings. From that point on, Kanodereka was able to secure permission for public meetings of the UANC with a mere phone call to Squires.[100]
- A few weeks prior to the Mugabe-Smith meeting, an MRA team went to visit officials at Mugabe's headquarters. One member of the group, a former secretary of foreign affairs under Smith, broke the ice after a tense beginning by sharing his struggle with the near-loss of a son injured in the war. A top ZANU official, the man who was instrumental in setting up the meeting a few weeks later between Mugabe and Smith, was deeply touched and responded by sharing his own experience of picking the body of his brother out of the trenches after a battle between Rhodesian Security Forces and ZANU.
- At the Geneva Conference in 1976, MRA was present and set up several meetings—albeit of no apparent consequence—between members of Smith's delegation and leaders of the UANC.[101]
- Aware that Ian Smith harbored bitterness toward the British for what he regarded as dishonesty and broken promises regarding Rhodesian independence, MRA workers arranged a meeting between Smith and several senior British diplomats who in their personal capacity apologized for British actions.[102]

Moral Discourse with Public Figures. The second major category into which MRA activities fell was efforts to inject moral principles into the decision-making process of key political leaders and, to a limited extent, of the public as well. "In order to build a new society, you must have people who are willing to begin with themselves," was the way Alec Smith summarized a key MRA assumption.[103] Henry Macnicol, described by some as the central strategist of MRA activities in Rhodesia, believes "you can change the system all you like but unless you change the hearts of men, you're changing nothing."[104] Yet another MRA worker put it this way: "If you change the attitude of one person, he begins to change society if he's a prominent person."[105]

Thus MRA hoped to support social change, but sought to do so by way of individual change. Whether engaging in private prayer sessions with Abel Muzorewa, meeting with aides of Joshua Nkomo, or arranging a one-on-one encounter between Robert Mugabe and Ian Smith, MRA workers maintained a clear, if often unspoken, agenda.[106] Their task was to enable individuals to listen to God. This would lead to a change of heart and to clarity about the "right" thing to do. And if leaders would get themselves oriented in the right direction, society must follow. MRA strategies for engaging leaders were several and varied, as discussed in the following paragraphs.

1. Dedicated pursuit of personal friendships formed the heart of MRA activities. Alec Smith, of course, related to his father extensively throughout the period and had many conversations with him about the issues he faced as prime minister.[107]

Another significant relationship was with Bishop Muzorewa, with whom several MRA workers met from the early 1970s onward. Senior MRA worker Henry Macnicol recalls accompanying Arthur Kanodereka in 1978 to visit Muzorewa after an embittering incident with the British. Muzorewa had been left out of a meeting with the liberation front leaders because, he was told by the British, he had no army. Concerned about the obvious temptation this offered for Muzorewa to establish his own army,[108] Macnicol and an accompanying MRA worker visited at some length with Muzorewa. At the end of the visit the three knelt and prayed and Muzorewa "thanked God for these men who have come to call me to my Christian faith."[109]

At Lancaster House in 1979, Macnicol and Hugh Elliott, a London-based MRA worker who knew Muzorewa from visits to Rhodesia, again met with Muzorewa. Elliott shared a "word from God" he felt that he had received specially for the bishop in "quiet time" that day. "Bishop," he told Muzorewa, "you just fight this election [the upcoming campaign in February 1980] as the man the people trust to be a man of God, and on the basis of love but not hate."[110]

MRA teams were present at both the failed Geneva Conference as well as Lancaster House and actively sought opportunities to interact with the negotiators in these critical meetings. At Geneva, Macnicol and Kanodereka (at that time still on the Executive Committee of the UANC) had breakfast several times with UANC leaders to discuss the negotiations. The king and queen of Romania joined one of these breakfasts to share insights from their personal struggle with bitterness in the aftermath of exile from fascist and communist governments.[111]

At Lancaster House, members of the eight-person MRA delegation had numerous late-night conversations with members of the negotiating teams.[112] A

common theme was the concern of the MRA workers that a settlement be reached. These meetings often took place without an explicit MRA identification. For example, the head of the African Farmers' Union stayed at the Moral Re-Armament House and, due to extensive prior relationships, MRA workers viewed him as part of the MRA "team." He arranged a meeting with Mugabe in his role as head of the Farmers' Union, not as a representative of MRA. Mugabe responded with great surprise and concern to the accounts of personal suffering among villagers offered to him.[113]

But it would be misleading to suggest that MRA workers established friendships with an agenda restricted to moral concern. MRA team members sought, particularly at the time of the Geneva and Lancaster House conferences, to support individual members of the negotiating teams on a personal basis.

Ian Smith, for example, was invited to the MRA guest house in London during the Lancaster House process and came, commenting later to son Alec that "it was such a change to come to that house." The MRA workers sought to create an atmosphere where the senior Smith "could relax like he was amongst friends."[114] Concerned about Smith's status as a pariah in London—other politicians on the scene were so reluctant about being in the same photograph with him that they refused to go near when the press were around—the MRA staff rang an old friend of Smith, a well-known retired European leader, and asked him to come to London to provide personal support for Smith.[115]

Similarly, MRA workers took members of Mugabe's team away to the country to relax on several weekends during Lancaster House.[116] Henry Macnicol sought to provide moral support to his old friend, Bishop Muzorewa, whose willingness to support new elections was essential and hung in the balance for much of the conference.[117]

2. Sharing a personal struggle or confessing wrong as a means of breaking barriers was an approach MRA workers used frequently with remarkable effect. Examples include Alec Smith's confession at the 1974 MRA conference in Salisbury; the meeting, described above, between MRA staff and Mugabe aides at which the ice was broken by an exchange, initiated by an MRA member, of intimate stories of personal struggle and tragedy; and the fruitful Reader-Chavunduka liaison in sponsoring dinner parties, begun as a result of Reader's confession to Chavunduka.

"It's a key MRA concept," reflects Alec Smith, "to be honest about yourself." Others may then "drop their guard" and respond with similar scrutiny of themselves. Politicians in particular are accustomed and resistant to being told what they ought to do, believes Smith. Often the only way to engage in dialogue at the level MRA sought was for MRA workers to take the first step toward personal vulnerability.[118]

3. Inviting carefully chosen outside visitors to Rhodesia was another frequently used approach. A group of about 20 MRA workers as far scattered as London, Washington, Caux (Switzerland), and Salisbury communicated regularly through letters and phone calls to identify candidates for these visits.[119] Several individuals with extensive previous experience in the British Foreign

Office were part of the British team and helped to ensure that the group did not commit political blunders. "We would constantly be trying to figure out who has the experience anywhere on the globe that is relevant to what is going on with these people at the center of these negotiations," recalls one of the participating MRA strategists.[120] From 1976 to 1979, MRA workers arranged two or three group tours and up to a dozen individual visits a year with visitors. In addition to the exiled king and queen of Romania, these included a minister of education from Australia, a West Indian cricket star, religious figures, business people, educators, and politicians. Some of these foreign visitors had 50 or more meetings, most of them private encounters with individuals or small groups, but some involving groups of 100 people or more.[121] The goal of these meetings was to encourage Rhodesian leaders to engage in moral reflection. The visitors did not preach; rather they shared personal experiences of transformation, reconciliation, and healing as a way of opening dialogue.

4. To exert moral influence on the larger society, MRA pursued a strategy of outreach to the public via publications, newspaper ads, and open meetings. Over the war years, MRA ran several full-page newspaper ads putting forward MRA concepts at key moments. Ten days before the 1980 elections, for example, MRA took out an ad in the leading newspapers of Salisbury, Gweru, and Bulawayo. It was a manifesto calling for "God-led unity" and urging Rhodesians to "rise above our conflicts and sufferings and launch the new Zimbabwe in unity and peace." "What is right, not who is right" is the key to the future, the manifesto proclaimed. Rhodesians should do three things: forgive others and ask forgiveness; live "with standards of absolute honesty, unselfishness, clear morals and care for one another"; and "help our leaders to do the same." Signatories included Chief Chirau, one of the participants in the Internal Settlement, and Cabinet of Conscience members Joram Kucherera, Alec Smith, and Stan O'Donnell, a former government cabinet member under Smith, along with 11 other Rhodesians from various walks of life.

MRA also held regular showings of MRA films[122] and circulated tens of thousands of copies of a pamphlet calling readers to set their own lives in order as a part of rebuilding the nation. Perhaps the greatest impact in the public arena was from the many dozens of meetings held throughout the country by Alec Smith and Arthur Kanodereka, who shared their experience of personal reconciliation and the principles through which they had found it.

Assessment of MRA Involvement

Moral Re-Armament is simultaneously the easiest and the hardest to assess of the three major groups in this case study. The Mugabe-Smith meeting without a doubt altered the history of the nation. It is certain that white Rhodesians would have fled the country in far greater numbers had it not been for the conciliatory mood between Mugabe and Smith resulting from this MRA-arranged meeting. Even if Mugabe had been planning a policy of reconciliation before this meeting, it is doubtful that jittery whites would have believed him—or cooperated so readily in

the critical early months of the transition—had Smith not led the way for them. Then, too, it is possible, if not probable, that the coup-in-waiting by General Walls would have been executed.

Beyond this verifiable success, MRA activities resist evaluation. Its goals and modus operandi were the most narrowly and self-consciously "spiritual" of the three groups. What mortal can judge whether the targets of MRA activities "listened to God" and acted accordingly, which is at the root of all that MRA sought to accomplish? Similarly, it is almost impossible to determine whether targeted public figures acted with greater moral conscience as a result of the promptings of MRA friends or associates or, if so, what the impact of their behavior might have been.

At its best, the MRA experience in Rhodesia offers inspiring insights about attitudinal and value changes unparalleled in either the Catholic or Quaker involvements (although the Catholic Church itself underwent an historic transformation in its relationship to the state). Underlying MRA encounters with the political actors was a radical sense of individual responsibility and openness to a transcending purpose. "How you respond could transform the entire situation" was implied in virtually every MRA encounter. Further implied was this: "Be prepared for the possibility that you will be guided, in the interests of reconciliation, in a direction that may be difficult and unpopular." It is difficult to imagine Joram Kucherera risking his life by setting up a meeting between two bitter enemies unless motivated by such values. Alec Smith, Arthur Kanodereka, Desmond Reader, Gordon Chavunduka, to mention only the more obvious examples, all experienced profound personal transformations through their encounter with MRA and undertook risky reconciliation efforts as a consequence.

MRA's genius lay in part in the way it communicated these values to others. Sharing a story with an inescapable moral or theological implication was at the heart of most MRA activities. This parable-telling approach enabled MRA workers to communicate values of individual responsibility and commitment to larger purpose without prescribing or preaching. Almost always the stories contained a central note of confession or error or vulnerability, further reducing defensiveness and inviting similar vulnerability from others.

MRA's emphasis on individual change demarcates it most clearly from the other actors in this study, particularly from the Catholics. Where the Church published dossiers to the world detailing the consequences of an unjust structure, MRA challenged individuals to do what is "right," as defined by general standards of honesty, purity, unselfishness, and love. MRA had been on record for decades in opposing racism—a creditworthy tradition to be sure—but it dealt with a structural evil by individual remedies.

This emphasis on individual change also made MRA workers both more sympathetic toward and attractive to the reformers of Rhodesia than to the revolutionaries. It is not chance that MRA's closest and most reliable affiliations were with Muzorewa and other compromised supporters of the Internal Settlement who in the end proved to be out of touch with the Rhodesian grass-roots. An emphasis on individual change as the avenue to social change, after all, is virtually

by definition a gradualist and reformist approach. In a situation that cried out for a sharp break from the structures of the past—the election of Mugabe established that this was surely the verdict of the majority of Zimbabweans—MRA attracted and publicly allied itself with reformers.

But Zimbabwe's revolutionaries must provide the final verdict on the work of Moral Re-Armament in Rhodesia. According to MRA workers, after the war both President Mugabe and one of his top lieutenants, then Security Minister Emmerson Munangagwa, initiated meetings in 1980 with MRA members to acknowledge their work.[123] Additionally, a few months after the elections, Zimbabwean Vice President Simon Muzenda summoned Alec Smith and Joram Kucherera to his office and thanked them for their role in the struggle for a new nation.[124] While these acknowledgments appear to have responded primarily to the Smith-Mugabe meeting, in 1982, Speaker of the House Didymus Mutasa addressed an MRA conference in Harare and spoke with enthusiasm of the importance of MRA's work and principles.[125] If in principle, then, MRA is vulnerable to criticism as individualist and reformist in approach, there is no denying the perceptions of those at the forefront of the struggle for structural change: the organization contributed in significant ways to the creation of a new Zimbabwe.

THE QUAKERS

Though both the Catholics and Moral Re-Armament played key roles in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict from their bases in Salisbury, in the end it was a London-based group of Quakers that became the most strategically involved in negotiation efforts to end the war. Between 1972 and 1980, Quakers conducted four missions to Africa in the interest of peaceful change in Rhodesia, and they sent delegations to both the Geneva and Lancaster House conferences. The trips to Africa formed the heart of the Quaker contribution, but London was the scene of other activities as well. On numerous occasions the Quakers met with leaders from the liberation movements visiting in London, and they met with staff from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) frequently.

Quaker Characteristics and Goals

Establishing Human Solidarity with All Parties. More than either the Catholics or Moral Re-Armament, the Quakers engaged the combatants in substantive discussion about the war and how to end it. This is paradoxical for, of the three groups, the Quakers consistently brought the simplest agenda to their meetings with the parties: establishing human solidarity with everyone involved. They engaged the parties at other levels, to be sure, as will become clear later. But, whether meeting Mugabe in Maputo, Nkomo in Lusaka, Muzorewa in Salisbury, or the heads of Frontline States, the Quakers' subordinated even the most ambitious tasks to their primary agenda: engaging the parties as human beings suffering from a ghastly war and struggling to find their way out. In a situation where everyone else was

lobbying for something, the Quakers were a unique phenomenon: a traveling reservoir of unconditional and uncomplicated good will.

Several points deserve particular attention: For one, the amount of time and effort a small group like the Quakers was prepared to devote to such an apparently innocuous activity is extraordinary. For another, the breadth of their connections was remarkable. They were best connected to black Rhodesians, notably the leaders of the external liberation fronts, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, and to Abel Muzorewa. Though they never succeeded in meeting with Ian Smith, they met regularly with several top white government officials, including an under secretary and a permanent secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and they regularly visited with business and church leaders in Salisbury.

But their connections extended well beyond the combatants. Keenly aware of the larger forces at work in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict, the Quakers maintained active personal ties to a network of leaders outside Rhodesia. In their missions they met with President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, and President Seretse Khama of Botswana. They also met with top officials in the capitals of each of these countries on several occasions, as well as with officials from Mozambique, South Africa, and Nigeria.

In addition, they met regularly with British and Commonwealth policymakers. These included a meeting with British Foreign Secretary Owen and many other meetings with officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). On numerous occasions they met with individual members of Parliament. They also maintained close ties with officials at the Commonwealth Secretariat, including Emeka Anyaoku, then deputy secretary-general.

This broad range of active relationships proved fundamental to the Quaker contribution. With the possible exception of British and American diplomats, who were inescapably perceived as bearing heavy agendas for their own governments, no other individuals or organizations maintained active communication with so broad a network of actors in the web of political influence at work in the conflict.

Seeking solidarity with others as an end in itself is an act of altruism, and altruism, even at its best, elicits skepticism in today's world. But the Quakers practiced their art with such transparent fidelity that expressions of compassion alone not only provided a consistent theme guiding their actions throughout the conflict but also served as their primary means of access.

Their primary agenda, for example, in their first several trips to Rhodesia and the Frontline States, in 1977 and 1978, was to express their concern about the suffering of the people of Rhodesia. This humble concern proved quite adequate to open doors. "Without exception we were warmly and sympathetically received and almost universally encouraged to remain in touch with the parties," recalled one team member later.[126] The same theme shaped Quaker involvements throughout. At a later stage, for example, when their role was well established and they were exploring the possibility of informal, off-the-record talks under Quaker auspices, concern for the ever-mounting suffering caused by the war continued to serve as their rationale for such an encounter.

It would be misleading, however, to highlight the effectiveness of a modest agenda as a means of entry without noting the context. The Quakers benefited enormously from their own history in solving the "entry problem." In addition to a reputation within the broader circles of diplomacy for a quiet, principled approach to peacemaking, the team operating in Rhodesia profited from a recent history of involvements in Rhodesia and elsewhere in Africa.

An American Quaker couple living in Salisbury, for example, had openly supported the African nationalist cause in the 1950s and 1960s, before the outbreak of violence, and the wife, Margaret Moore, had served as secretary of two political parties started by Joshua Nkomo. A British Quaker couple had worked extensively with families of political detainees held by the Smith government in the mid-1960s, developed a friendship with Sally Mugabe, the activist wife of Robert Mugabe, and also made acquaintance with nationalists Robert Mugabe, Joshua Nkomo, and Josiah Chinamano. Another Quaker couple had worked extensively with political prisoners in the 1960s and 1970s, and, backed by funds from British Quakers, they founded a well-known rural training center at Hlekweni. The husband, Roy Henson, was the only white member of the African National Council, a broadly based coalition of African nationalists, at its founding in 1971, the heyday of its credibility in the African nationalist community.[127]

Old connections also assisted the Quakers in gaining entry into the extraordinary range of governments influencing the evolution of the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict. The British high commissioner in Botswana was himself a Quaker and arranged meetings there with President Khama. In Mozambique, the Quaker team met a warm welcome from President Joachim Chissano because of assistance American Quakers had given to gaining United Nations recognition for Frelimo.[128] In Zambia, President Kaunda had known Quakers for many years.[129]

Thus when the Quaker team initiated a role in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict by sending a team to the Geneva Conference in 1976, they were pleased to discover that many of the delegates, particularly the nationalists, were already personally acquainted with one or more of their team members. This provided ready access to many delegates, particularly for private meetings in hotel rooms.[130] One key member of the team felt in retrospect that later mediation efforts would have been far more difficult had it not been for this "pioneering" work of other Quakers in the country and region.[131]

Access to white Rhodesian government officials was deficient throughout the Quaker effort, but the two best Quaker contacts also resulted from Quaker history. The under secretary of foreign affairs had years earlier participated in a Quaker conference for diplomats as well as in the Quaker-sponsored London Diplomats Group and had been deeply impressed with Quaker commitments. As a result, he met with Quaker delegates regularly in their visits to Salisbury and commented later that Walter Martin had "changed his life" with his low-key but persistent emphasis on compassion, reconciliation, and justice.[132] The permanent secretary of foreign affairs was a personal friend of a Quaker family in Salisbury. This introduction led to a request by the permanent secretary that the Quakers seek the

release of a dozen white Rhodesians who had been abducted into Mozambique by guerrilla forces.[133]

But the team of peacemakers benefited from more than Quaker history; they also demonstrated the genuineness of their compassion by calling a network of Quaker relief organizations into play in the conflict. The war created many refugees; the most hard-pressed fled the country to Mozambique, Zambia, and Botswana. At the urging of the team of peacemakers, Quaker service agencies or foundations forwarded cash and materials to the Red Cross in Salisbury for refugees within Rhodesia, as well as to U.N. organizations, to the Christian Council of Mozambique for refugees under the care of ZANU, and also directly to ZANU and ZAPU for refugees. The amounts sent were modest, totaling some 10,500 pounds sterling in value at the time, but they reinforced the genuineness of the Quaker concern.

Whatever the advantages offered by Quaker history and charitable activities, the original point still holds: a simple, straightforward agenda of concern for the human beings involved in the conflict was the dominant theme of Quaker involvement and provided their primary tool for entry. Entry, after all, is never a once-and-done challenge; mediators must constantly re-earn the trust that sustains their role. The Quaker team benefited from their past, but they moved far beyond it by their tireless rounds of personal contact with key parties.

Disciplined Listening. If expressing concern for human suffering opened doors for the Quakers, practicing disciplined listening opened hearts. In memos drawn up in preparation for major missions, the desire to hear and support the parties invariably topped the list. The number-one goal chosen by the team that attended the Geneva Conference was typical: "To build up relationships with participants so as to develop a sympathetic understanding of their fears, hopes and intentions and to support and strengthen their efforts at achieving a just settlement in a conciliatory manner."[134] Listening well opened the doors for further conversation, for increasingly the parties became eager to know what the Quakers were hearing from *other* parties.[135] The Quakers were diligent not to betray confidences but found that their own growing knowledge of the situation soon became a resource eagerly sought by the parties. "Very rarely was access a problem," recalls Trevor Jepson, a key member of the team. Thus the Quaker role emerged from the dynamics of the relationships that were formed. "We felt we had been put into the role and must continue."[136]

It would be simplistic, of course, to suggest that the Quakers held no goals in their meetings other than listening. Clearly they sought to influence the parties to function more humanely and to encourage nonviolent means of resolving the conflict. But listening was for the Quakers no mere prelude to serious talk. Listening was itself a genuine contribution to change—a means to support the dignity, credibility, and rationality of the individuals with whom they were interacting. And because the Quakers consulted widely each time they expanded their role, listening was also a manifestation of their political values. Rather than give advice, the Quakers *sought* advice about what they should do and at all times

presented themselves as quiet servants of the needs of the parties. Theirs was the politics of transformative listening.

Opening Channels of Communication. As the parties' trust in the Quakers grew, the depth of their discussions expanded and, with it, so did the scope of possible Quaker involvements. The Quakers were open at all times about their contacts with other parties and, as a result, people with whom they were meeting asked them to convey messages to other parties on several occasions, as follows.

In May 1979, President Nyerere requested a "personal, nongovernmental link" with Muzorewa, then prime minister of Rhodesia.[137] Nyerere was deeply concerned about the potential for the conflict to expand into an East-West confrontation and hoped that Muzorewa might assist in moderating the war. In addition to establishing a communication link, he sought from Muzorewa a less bellicose stance toward the Frontline States and toward the Patriotic Front itself. The Quakers carried the request to Muzorewa, who responded positively to the idea of a link. This led to a second round of "shuttle diplomacy" for the Quakers, to explore further the nature and purpose of such a nongovernmental link. In their second meeting, Muzorewa handed to Walter Martin, the Quaker representative, a packet of conciliatory letters to deliver: to Nyerere, Kaunda, Mugabe, and Nkomo.

That same day, however, the Rhodesian Air Force bombed Lusaka in a "preemptive strike" against Nkomo's troops headquartered there, a move later publicly endorsed by Muzorewa. That Muzorewa had a hand in planning this military adventurism was perhaps unlikely. But even the kindest interpretation of his role suggested that Muzorewa was impotent to control his own government, and Nyerere concluded there was now no point in further communication with the prime minister. "Perhaps, after all, the British will help more to solve the Rhodesia problem than the Bishop," he mused to Martin.[138]

A month later, Nyerere played a key role in the move to convene the Lancaster House conference. At the gathering of the Commonwealth states in August in Lusaka, the elder statesman of Africa called for British intervention in Rhodesia and all-party talks among the combatants. In the days that followed, Thatcher, Nyerere, and others in a six-member caucus forged an unprecedented consensus: the recently "elected" Muzorewa/Smith government would remain unrecognized and instead constitutional negotiations would begin as soon as possible under British auspices.

There were other instances of Quaker efforts to open channels of communication.

- Toward the end of 1978, several members of the Quaker team met with David Owen, a key formulator of British policy as head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In response to a comment by the Quakers about the depth of suspicions that existed within the Patriotic Front regarding the motives of the British, Owen expressed a desire for more interaction with Robert Mugabe.

- A few weeks later, in November 1978, the Quakers mentioned this to Mugabe's associates and received their support to work on such a meeting, so long as it could be set up in a way that threatened no damage to the fragile unity of the Patriotic Front. One possibility would be for the Quakers to arrange for Mugabe to address a small group of people at the Quaker House in London, a meeting to which Owen and other FCO officials would also be invited. Personal interaction could follow such a meeting without the implications of a formal, planned encounter. Preliminary signals from both parties were positive, such that the Quakers arranged funding for Mugabe's trip and began making arrangements for meetings. But in the end, other events intervened and the trip never took place.[139]
- The Quakers provided financial support in late 1978 for a peace initiative by three black African nationalist Rhodesians. At their request, the Quakers secured funds for travel enabling further discussion of a proposal to found the Committee for Permanent Indaba in Rhodesia. This initiative looked promising for several months, but fell to pieces when Reverend Arthur Kanodereka, the central figure, was assassinated.[140] Though the Quakers had no role other than providing moral and financial support for the initiative, the incident demonstrates the depth of the Quaker commitment to support any bona fide effort to establish negotiation among the parties.
- In early 1979, after British Prime Minister James Callaghan had explored the prospect of, but then decided against, convening all-party talks, the Quakers actively pursued the possibility of bringing together a small, private, informal gathering of second-level people from all parties.[141] In a series of meetings over a period of several months, the team consulted extensively with officials, many of them at high levels, from the United Nations, Zambia, Tanzania, Nigeria, and England, in addition to top-level representatives from the liberation armies and Smith's government. Responses to the possibility of such a gathering were generally positive. But again, other events overtook the initiative.[142]
- At Lancaster House, the Quakers met informally with numerous delegates, many of whom had by now become old friends. From these conversations arose six different requests to bring individuals or groups who were officially incommunicado together in special meetings. The chairman of one of the Rhodesian internal parties, for example, requested assistance in meeting delegates from ZANU and ZAPU, the much more radical external political fronts, and the Quakers arranged such a meeting.[143] In another instance, the Quakers conveyed to Nkomo and Mugabe a query from the Salisbury government delegation about the possibility of an informal meeting of Muzorewa, Nkomo, and Mugabe.

Supporting Formal Negotiations. The Quakers never viewed their work as more than a footnote to a larger story. There were moments, to be sure, when the footnote nearly leaped into the text. But even in their most ambitious efforts to convene face-to-face meetings between representatives of the parties, the Quakers saw themselves as serving a larger process: formal negotiations that would have to involve the British in a convening role.[144] Most of the activities already described above had the effect of supporting formal negotiations. But there were other activities that also deserve mention, as follows.

- In October 1978, after their second major mission to Africa in which they had met representatives of all the key parties, the Quakers arranged a meeting with British Foreign Secretary Owen. They sent a follow-up letter a few days later, listing 10 concerns and suggestions regarding ways to move the negotiation process forward. They stressed "the need for preparation, yet speed, in convening an All-Party Conference."[145]
- The Quakers usually informed the British Foreign Office before leaving on their trips, and on several occasions they visited with officials from the FCO upon returning.
- The Quakers held a series of interviews in Lusaka, Maputo, and Salisbury with representatives of virtually all the key parties just after the Lusaka Commonwealth Conference in 1979. The external liberation fronts, in particular, were deeply skeptical of British motivations. The Quaker team listened to these objections but still supported the viability of the Lancaster House negotiations as a step to end the war.
- Present at both the failed Geneva Conference as well as Lancaster House, the Quakers interacted with many key delegates and sought to offer low-key suggestions about courses of action and attitudes to adopt that they felt would enhance the likelihood of resolution. At Lancaster House the Quakers wrote personal letters of welcome to all the delegates whom they knew personally and met with many of them privately—in all, over 100 meetings.[146] In these conversations, they tried to interpret the perspectives of each delegation to other delegations.[147] "Our role had become that of a lubricant," reflected Trevor Jepson later, "by identifying sticking points and where appropriate making representation with a view to problems being overcome rather than used as a reason to break off negotiations."[148]
- As it became apparent at Lancaster House that the British would supervise a transitional period, the Quakers directed substantial effort to influencing British policymakers toward strategies that, based on their interactions with all the parties, the Quakers believed were essential to the implementation of the cease-fire and establishment of monitoring forces. They had numerous meetings with officials in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, wrote letters to Lord Carrington, and in one instance, to Prime Minister Thatcher.[149]
- At one point the Patriotic Front threatened to walk out of the Lancaster House talks, as did the Salisbury delegation on another occasion. In both instances, the Quakers urged the delegates in private conversations to stay—in the interests of the people of Rhodesia as a whole.
- It was a secret to no one that the Patriotic Front struggled to maintain unity between the parties of Mugabe and Nkomo. Predictably, the Lancaster House talks brought new strains to this relationship that the Quakers sought

to overcome by stressing to both Patriotic Front wings the importance of a unified stand.

- Toward the end of the Lancaster House conference it became apparent that there was poor coordination between the Patriotic Front and the Frontline States and that the British were using this to increase pressure on the Patriotic Front. Concerned that this could lead to misunderstanding and abrogation of agreements later, the Quakers encouraged African diplomats to better coordinate their policies.[150]
- In the months just after Lancaster House, an advisor to Nkomo asked the Quakers to relay a message to a British MP requesting that Carrington be sent to Rhodesia urgently to render an "agreed interpretation of the Lancaster House Agreement." The request was delivered but Carrington remained in England.[151]

Advocating Policies and Actions in Support of Reconciliation. The Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict presented the Quaker intermediaries with seemingly conflicting roles. On the one hand, they were mediators, at least potentially, and keen to maintain their impartiality. On the other hand, they were deeply sensitive to questions of justice. They were also British citizens, concerned that their own government handle its role responsibly, and they had access to a variety of key British policymakers, the majority of whom knew far less about the dynamics of the Rhodesia situation than did the Quakers. At several points, therefore, the Quakers shifted from the role of mediator to policy advocate in relationship to their own government. They chose to go to Geneva, for example, in part because the British government was reticent to assist a peaceful transition by being involved in any way in a transitional period. The Quakers felt that it might be necessary to play a role in "informing the UK public and building a sympathetic understanding" for support of agreements reached.[152]

The Quakers harmonized their roles in this complex situation by framing their advocacy in the language of reconciliation. For example:

- They conveyed to several British Members of Parliament their conviction that if sanctions against Rhodesia were lifted too soon, the fighting would escalate and the war would be prolonged.
- In the months prior to the Lusaka decision to call all-party talks, they communicated to British officials the universal rejection among African leaders of the Muzorewa/Smith Internal Settlement government and the concern raised by President Nyerere that if Great Britain and the United States recognized the Salisbury government, a major East-West conflict was likely to result.
- At Lancaster House, as described above, they devoted substantial effort toward helping the British and the Rhodesian government understand the concerns of the Patriotic Front, in order to reduce the likelihood of a walkout or abrogation later of an agreement perceived to be unfair.
- Also at Lancaster House, Quakers participated in writing several briefing papers designed to inform and influence all parties. Mediation team member Tony Gilpin, for example, assisted the Catholic Institute for International Relations in preparation of a briefing paper regarding cease-fire arrangements.[153]
- In the two-month interim period between the Lancaster House agreement and the elections, a report by Quaker Adam Curle raised concerns in urgent tones about British handling of sensitive governance issues in Rhodesia.
- In the same period, Quakers cooperated with Tim Sheehy of the Catholic Institute for International Relations in writing a letter to Lord Soames suggesting measures to reduce tensions before and after the elections.[154]

In other instances they sought to influence the liberation fronts toward actions they thought would be constructive:

- Following the downing of a civilian aircraft by Nkomo's troops in September 1978, Gilpin and his Quaker colleague, Trevor Jepson, pointed out in a meeting with ZAPU officials the serious damage that had been done to ZAPU's credibility by the incident.
- Throughout their involvement, the Quakers were deeply concerned about the great fear expressed by whites about the liberation fronts, particularly Mugabe's ZANU forces. In a meeting with ZANU officials in October 1978, Jepson and Gilpin noted the amount of thought being given in ZANU to the nature of the new society sought for Zimbabwe: changes were to be made gradually, "avoiding the mistakes made through precipitate action in other African countries."[155] Impressed, the two stressed to the ZANU leadership the importance of conveying this thinking to Rhodesia and the outside world.

Grounded in deep principles of justice and fairness, the Quakers were open at all times about their own values. But they were cautious in advocating specific strategies to be taken by a given party. When they did, however, as in the above instances, they couched their appeals in the language of a higher nonpartisan purpose: reconciliation, fairness, and long-term peace. "Our motivating power is reconciliation, not advocacy" was the way senior team member Walter Martin put it.[156]

Assessment of Quaker Involvement

The Quaker involvements in Rhodesia are, at one level, a study in failure as a fundamental aspect of peacemaking. The Quakers invested substantially in four major efforts to set up meetings among top leaders, all of which failed to materialize: a Nyerere-Muzorewa link in 1979; an Owen-Mugabe meeting in 1978; an effort to convene a meeting of second-level leaders in 1979; and the peace initiative by Kanodereka, Hove, and Chigwida in 1978, which the Quakers funded. What, then, did the Quakers contribute?

Fundamental to a response to this question is an understanding of the nature of the Quaker focus. While MRA focused on individual and attitudinal change, and the Catholics on structural change, the Quakers focused on perceptions and

processes that would enable a negotiated settlement. In the end, the parties reached this outcome at Lancaster House, rendering the work of the Quakers almost invisible against the backdrop of larger success. Their work was so interwoven in the complex fabric of influences moving the parties toward a negotiated peace that it is virtually impossible to isolate the Quaker impact from that of other more visible and powerful actors.

But one measure might be the amount of access accorded the Quakers by the parties. Mugabe, Nkomo, and Muzorewa, as well as many of their top aides, met repeatedly with the Quakers throughout their involvement in the conflict. These leaders must have found the meetings useful. The British apparently recognized the significance of the Quaker role as well: when at the start of the Lancaster House talks Lord Carrington invited the incoming delegates to a dinner party, the only person not affiliated with any of the parties was Quaker Walter Martin.

Another measure of the value of the Quaker contribution can be found in subsequent comments made by the parties. A few weeks after Mugabe's election in early 1980, two prominent members of ZANU strongly encouraged the Quakers to maintain a role in Zimbabwe, with a focus on race relations.[157] A leading figure in the Commonwealth Secretariat echoed this sentiment, stressing the need for informal gatherings between whites and blacks.[158] Josiah Chinamano, a leading figure in ZAPU, also encouraged a Quaker role in the post-independence period, adding that "not only we but you have a responsibility in all this."[159] Joseph Msika, another top ZAPU leader endorsed this, adding that a quality he had always appreciated about the Quakers was their optimism: "During our darkest times in Lusaka, we were greatly heartened by visits from Quakers whose faith in the possibility of progress towards peace helped to revive our hopes."[160] President Nyerere wrote a letter thanking the Quakers for their work in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.[161] A U.N. diplomat commented some years later that it was widely recognized that "the Quakers had played an important part in creating the conditions for a satisfactory settlement."[162]

The personal assistant to Nyerere expressed a similar conviction a few months after Lancaster House. In a letter of "congratulations to you and your colleagues who have been active for peace with justice in Zimbabwe," she expressed to Walter Martin her belief that "the quiet intervention of Quaker Peace and Service personnel may well have had a special importance at different moments in the lead-up to Lusaka, and during the Conference itself."[163]

Then, too, there are times when nothing clarifies like failure. President Nyerere was angry and let down by the Rhodesian air strikes against Lusaka that coincided with the messages the Quakers were conveying between him and Muzorewa. But having failed in his effort to work cooperatively with Muzorewa through the good offices of the Quakers, he was prepared a few weeks later to take leadership in the call for the British to convene the Lancaster House negotiations. It is likely that this Quaker-assisted failure contributed to the evolution of Nyerere's decisive stance.

It is precisely the difficulty of "proving" success or impact that illustrates an important characteristic of many religious peacemakers. The Quakers intentionally operated in such a way that their own contribution to any success would be invisible. They made no effort to hide their role, but they sought to be genuine servants to the interests of others, and they understood that their ability to contribute depended on keeping a Quaker stake in the outcome to a minimum. To paraphrase American sociologist Robert Theobald: you can have social change, or you can have credit for social change, but you can't have both at the same time.[164]

Thus it should come as no surprise that the Quakers would be the least concerned about evidence of "success." Religious peacemakers at their best engage in their work, ultimately, not because they seek success, but rather because they feel "called" by a reality larger than the empirical "facts" in the situation. If this appears at one level to be naive or unrealistic, at another it reflects what is perhaps the fundamental asset of the religious intermediary. War, after all, is a consequence of the loss of hope that talking can yield results. Any peacemaker motivated by "success" as a yardstick would fade quickly in the atmosphere of pessimism that envelops most serious conflicts. A sense of transcendent calling is more sustaining than pragmatic ambition, and the Quakers, faithful to their call, persevered in the face of long odds and major setbacks.

Spiritual Dimensions of the Quaker Approach

ZAPU leader Msika's description of the Quakers was insightful, but, if anything, it understated the truth. Quakers are more than optimistic; they are "cosmically optimistic." God, who is loving and good, is seen to be present everywhere working to bring things aright. The hopefulness, then, that pervades the Quakers' work is not the cocky but ultimately brittle confidence of a clever strategist or a skilled practitioner. Rather, it is the calm assurance of a spiritual thinker who knows that, all appearances to the contrary, in the end a deeper reality will prevail. It is difficult to imagine anyone functioning with the quiet perseverance that characterizes Quaker mediation efforts without such a deeply rooted optimism.

Claims to "trust in God," of course, are as common as the American penny.[165] But Quakers add to it an essential trust in human beings. For centuries they have taught that within the heart of even the tyrant there exists a divine spark. The challenge is to kindle that spark, to "speak to that of God in every person." Thus Quakers are hopeful about the possibility of establishing constructive relationships even in discouraging circumstances with difficult people.

Other traits come closely aligned. If God resides in every person, there is no room for pretense, arrogance, or superficiality in relations with others. Nor is there room for injustice, selfishness, or "looking after our own" at the expense of other people. It was not by chance that the Quakers won trust rapidly with most of the people with whom they met. Though they were "foreigners" to most of their contacts, they operated with such modesty, such transparent openness to and concern for each party, that doors opened relatively quickly for them.

Getting through the door, after all, was the sole prerequisite for the Quakers' role. The situation was not yet ripe for negotiation, either face-to-face or via "shuttle diplomacy." The Quakers focused rather on preparatory efforts at the

level of attitudes, understanding, information, and rational analysis—activities that required little more of the parties than to engage in thoughtful discussion with the visiting peacemakers.

The whole Quaker contribution depended, then, on a quality of interpersonal bearing that, more than merely psychological or sociological, is profoundly rooted in faith and theology. Getting "through the door" is no spiritual exercise, of course, but the Quaker example suggests that the right kind of spiritual roots are an enormous asset. An interpersonal bearing that is grounded in a spiritual vision brings consistency, congruency, and simplicity of purpose to the task, and thus heightens the odds of getting through the many doors that await the aspiring peacemaker—and of rapidly building trust once inside. This bearing, reinforced by the Quaker reputation for integrity, nonpartisanship, and work in the field of peace and justice, secured for the team ready and continued access to the parties in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict. While there was was little in the Quakers' words and actions that appeared "spiritual," then, it is difficult to imagine a comparable effort being conducted without a deeply spiritual base.

OTHER RELIGIOUS EFFORTS

Though less involved in direct conversation with the combatants than the three groups that form the heart of this chapter, the work of the Christian Council of Rhodesia at least deserves mention. From 1964 onward, the council was a focus of ecumenical efforts within Rhodesia to oppose the Smith government and the war it was waging. Though sympathetic to the African nationalist perspective throughout, from 1971 to 1979 the council was often paralyzed in the debate between the moderate nationalism associated with Bishop Muzorewa and the more militant nationalism of the external liberation movements.[166]

In July 1979, the council formed a Christian Council Reconciliation Committee (RC) to initiate involvement in the quest for political solutions. The RC undertook as its primary goal to seek unity among the African nationalist parties, now bitterly divided by the Internal Settlement.[167] Though able to meet Muzorewa, himself a member of the Executive Committee of the Christian Council until 1978, the RC was prevented by logistical problems of travel arrangements and visas from meeting with Mugabe and Nkomo.[168]

Four members of the RC traveled to Lancaster House, with a clear mission: "to impress upon the three main actors on the Zimbabwean scene the need to end the war in Zimbabwe through Political Reconciliation."[169] One of their main concerns was to support unity among the African leaders.[170] The RC made several efforts to get Muzorewa, Mugabe, and Nkomo to meet, but gave up when Nkomo[171] declined. Instead, they met separately with the three leaders and their aides: three times with Mugabe, twice with Muzorewa, and twice with Nkomo. They pleaded moderation with all three, stressing the suffering taking place at home. To the liberation movements they urged that so long as the settlement put full political control in the hands of the majority, including control of the police and security

forces, the remaining issues were not urgent enough to block agreement.[172] Muzorewa, for his part, promised he would not "stand in the way of a good deal for Zimbabwe."[173]

In the latter part of the Lancaster House conference, the group sought to support "the credentials of the Patriotic Front to Christian groups in Great Britain and to the international press."[174]

CONCLUSION

The three religious groups in this study present a remarkably broad spectrum of responses to conflict. What is the problem that peacemakers are choosing to address? The question cleaves to the heart of the differences between these three groups. Consider the following spectrum of problem analysis:

	Persons	Processes	Structures	
Microanalysis <	----------	----------	----------	> Macroanalysis

Moral Re-Armament focused on the personal aspects of the problem: individuals were not living according to high moral standards nor listening to God, and, consequently, conflict and injustice prevailed. Thus MRA devoted almost exclusive attention to reaching individuals and working for attitudinal and moral change. MRA left a mark, willy nilly, on the processes by which the parties communicated with each other and on the structures that emerged as a result of its work with individuals. The Mugabe-Smith meeting, after all, probably altered the destiny of the nation. But these processes and structures were effects, not the targets of MRA activities.

The Catholics, for the most part, defined the problem as *structural*: the political and economic structures were fundamentally unjust and needed to be overhauled. This required mobilizing opinion against the existing structures via publications and lobbying efforts. The Catholics, too, devoted some attention to problems of process. The Catholic appeal to commence negotiations, made directly to the parties a year before Lancaster House and to the international community just prior to the Commonwealth meeting in Lusaka, undoubtedly was one of several important influences that eventually brought the parties to the table. But the Catholics influenced process by structural methods. They were moral lobbyists within the structures of power, not facilitators of negotiation.

The Quakers centered their activities around problems of *process*: the parties were not communicating clearly, and negotiation efforts were bedeviled by misinformation, misinterpretations, and a lack of forums and mechanisms to communicate constructively. The Quakers sought to fill this gap, interpreting each side's concerns to the others, conveying messages, trying to arrange face-to-face meetings, exploring options for resolution with the parties informally at Lancaster House and elsewhere. Far more so than either MRA or the Catholics, the Quakers were involved in discussion of substantive issues with a broad range of leaders, and thus they came the closest to a mediating role.

Although the Quakers devoted the bulk of their attention to problems of process, they were also directly concerned with individuals and with structural problems. Like MRA, they spent a great deal of time with individual leaders in a listening and supportive role. Like the Catholics, they demonstrated a profound awareness of structural imbalances. Though they were careful not to endanger their mediation role through open activism, they interacted quietly with London-based groups, such as CIIR and the British Council of Churches, which sought to highlight injustice in Rhodesia, and they sought to influence the British government to take what they felt would be more enlightened approaches to the situation.

The groups focused on different aspects of the problem because they defined the problem itself differently, and the stategies they employed differed accordingly. But the effect of the three involvements proved to be complementary in nature. The Catholics and the Quakers recognized this and cooperated throughout the war years by keeping each other well informed about their respective activities. Contacts between MRA and the other two groups were minimal, however, and this seems a regrettable gap. Closer cooperation—if only in the sharing of information and insights about the conflict—particularly between the Quakers and MRA might have substantially enhanced the work of both organizations.

The three groups shared a striking similarity: all dealt with the "entry" problem by the use of listening strategies. Individuals from both the Quakers and MRA teams repeatedly emphasized in later interviews the importance of low-key, nonjudgmental listening to the parties as a central part of their work, and both organizations spent enormous amounts of time doing it. The Catholics were less self-conscious about it, but they based their truth-telling on listening nevertheless. The far-flung network of Catholic personnel in Rhodesia and the reports from the thousands of individuals who brought complaints to the Commission for Justice and Peace formed the backbone of Catholic truth-telling efforts in the world arena. If anything sets the work of these three religious organizations apart from that of many other organizations, it is the scope and the quality of the listening in which they engaged.

Did the religious groups make a difference in the outcome of the conflict? This conflict was concluded by formal political negotiations, and the religious groups were only several of the numerous actors on the scene. Clear proof of their impact is hard to come by. Even so, the answer is unequivocally yes.

The evidence is episodic but incontrovertible in the case of MRA where Ian Smith, a key protagonist, confirms that the MRA-brokered meeting altered his subsequent public response to Mugabe before a breathless nation.[175] The evidence is less dramatic in the case of the Catholics, who tirelessly goaded the world to take action on Rhodesia. But the magnitude and scope of the Catholic efforts, particularly at truth-telling, make it virtually certain that the conflict would have been prolonged and the human toll thus substantially higher had the Church not been so deeply involved. With regard to the Quakers, the evidence is neither decisive nor voluminous. Yet the levels of access gained to the disputing parties and to key external policymakers, and those parties' expressions of appreciation afterward suggest that the Quakers played a role that the parties found constructive as they

groped their way towards a settlement. It is hard to imagine the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict becoming "ripe"[176] for resolution and moving into a new dispensation with so little bitterness had it not been for the roles played by these religious actors.

This study suggests that there may not have been a "religious response" per se to the conflict, but rather that there was a multiplicity of responses—conceivably available to anyone—that were undertaken by religious bodies. What sets these religious groups apart was their unique ability to combine elements essential to resolving many conflicts. The values that motivated them, the methods of operation that sprang from those values, the transcendent identity they frequently held in the eyes of the parties and others, and the international support structures that sustained them enabled the religious actors to accomplish essential preparatory tasks that were beyond the reach of any other intervenor.

Notes

1. The guerrilla forces of the Patriotic Front called the country Zimbabwe, and the government of Abel Muzorewa (May–December 1979) called it Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. For simplicity, in this study the name Rhodesia will be used in reference to the period prior to formal independence and the takeover by a bona fide government on April 18, 1980; thereafter its contemporary name, Zimbabwe, will be used. Similarly, the capital city will be referred to as Salisbury prior to formal independence and as Harare thereafter. The conflict itself will be referred to as the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict.

2. Interview with M. Kuchera, Zimbabwe Council of Churches, Harare, August 19, 1992.

3. Unlike other colonies, Rhodesia had been granted status as a "self-governing colony" in 1923, but in an effort to "restrain the racist excesses of the settlers," England still retained a right of veto over aspects of governance, particularly those having to do with black rights (Anthony J. Chennells, "White Rhodesian Nationalism—The Mistaken Years," in *Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe 1890–1990*, ed. Canaan S. Banana [Harare: College Press, 1989], 123–27).

4. White leaders in Pretoria remained committed, to be sure, to an apartheid system even more comprehensively racist than Rhodesia's. But Vorster and Co. were playing shrewdly to win a long-term game of *realpolitik*. In 1962 South African Prime Minister John Vorster had already counseled Rhodesian Prime Minister Winston Field against a Unilateral Declaration of Independence from England, on the grounds that, unlike South Africa, Rhodesia's African majority was so vast as to rule out the possibility of a white-ruled state. Black rule in Rhodesia, Vorster maintained, was inevitable, and it would be better for Rhodesian whites to move cautiously and cultivate a moderate black leadership (personal communication from journalist Colin Legum, who interviewed Field on this question, dated November 20, 1992). Furthermore, strategists in Pretoria, contemplating the lessons of a Mozambique suddenly gone fanatically Marxist, had concluded that prolonged guerrilla warfare created radical nationalism. Thus white racism to the north increasingly looked destabilizing for the region to Pretoria. Much better to succor instead the emergence of a pliable client state like Malawi. That required not arms for fellow white racists, but black faces in government offices in Salisbury.

5. Bishop Muzorewa was brought into politics in 1971 with foot-dragging reluctance because his nonpolitical background made him acceptable as leader to the several factions

of nationalists seeking to oppose an agreement worked out between the British and Ian Smith. But by 1975, he was thoroughly despised by ZANU and ZAPU, the external liberation fronts, for entering into negotiations with Ian Smith against the wishes of fellow nationalists. Cf. note 8.

6. Ian Linden, *The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe* (London: Longman, 1980), 272.

7. In Zambia one camp alone contained 6,000 boys who had been separated from their parents (interview with Trevor Jepson, a member of the Quaker conciliation team, Wales, July 7, 1991).

8. The Patriotic Front consisted of two liberation movements: the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), headed by Robert Mugabe and based in Maputo, and the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU), headed by Joshua Nkomo and based in Lusaka. In 1976, at the urging of leaders from surrounding African states, the movements joined forces in an uneasy alliance and formed the Patriotic Front. The two movements had different political orientations, different sponsors, and different instincts about when and on what issues to compromise with the Rhodesian government; both sought preeminence in the eventual new Zimbabwe. The resulting tension constantly threatened their ability to collaborate during the war, at Lancaster House, and after independence.

9. Interview with Ian Robertson, Harare, May 25, 1991. Robertson is a Scottish biologist who moved to Rhodesia in 1977 to assist with MRA activities and has been deeply involved there ever since.

10. ZANU Death List, issued by Dr. Edison Zvobgo, deputy secretary for information and publicity in Maputo, November 13, 1978.

11. Interview with Robertson. A panga is a sword-like traditional African weapon.

12. Interview with Robertson, May 25, 1991, and with Ian Smith, Harare, April 28, 1992.

13. Victor de Waal, *The Politics of Reconciliation* (London: Hurst and Co., 1990), 46.

14. Lord Christopher Soames, speaking on his arrival at Heathrow Airport on April 19, 1980, as quoted in Hugh Elliott, *Dawn in Zimbabwe: Concept for a Nation* (London: Grosvenor Books, 1980), 9.

15. Since 1980 Zimbabwe has experienced crises that belie Mugabe's noble words. The conflict in Matebeleland in the early 1980s was particularly tragic, an African ethnic conflict writ large in a struggle for political power that cost thousands of lives. But given the recent background of a high-stakes and divisive war of liberation, the sense of reconciliation that still characterizes the country is remarkable; equally remarkable are the consistent efforts to restore unity with former opponents after each crisis. Joshua Nkomo, former ZAPU leader and Mugabe's rival during the war for the mantle of chief nationalist, was the instigator of the Matabeleland conflict, but he was later brought back into government as a result of a lengthy series of negotiations mediated by Methodist minister and former President Canaan Banana from 1983 to 1987. Nkomo currently serves as vice-president under President Mugabe. So consistent has the theme of reconciliation been that one author, Victor de Waal, called his study of the first decade of Zimbabwe's history, *The Politics of Reconciliation*.

16. To list just a few examples: Canaan Banana, the first president of Zimbabwe (1980-87), was an ordained Methodist minister. Robert Mugabe, like many other liberation leaders, was educated in Catholic mission schools and maintained active communication with Catholic leaders throughout the war. Nationalists Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole, who in the end discredited themselves in a fatal alliance with Smith, were both ordained ministers.

17. See David Lan's fascinating account, *Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985).

18. Gary Strong, *Keys to Effective Prayer* (Basingstoke, U.K.: Marshalls, 1985), 11-24.

19. The Frontline States consisted of Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Botswana, and Angola, a "closely-knit caucus within the Organization of African States" formed in 1974 to achieve majority rule in southern Africa. Their influence on the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe struggle was critical, particularly because of Zambia and Mozambique, both of which were hosting a Zimbabwean liberation army. For more information, see Colin Legum's encyclopedic work, *The Battlefronts of Southern Africa* (New York: Africana Publishing, 1988), 26ff.

20. Linden, *Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 95.

21. Interview with Sister Janice McLaughlin, Harare, May 6, 1991.

22. Linden identifies the establishment of the JPC as a turning point for the Rhodesian Catholic Church, "the first formal structural commitment to social justice made by the hierarchy" (Linden, *Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 163).

23. Ibid., 196.

24. Roman Catholic Bishops' Conference, April 25, 1973, quoted in Linden, *Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 190.

25. Ibid., 197.

26. Whites had viewed themselves as subjects of the Crown from the time Cecil Rhodes's Pioneer Column arrived from British-ruled South Africa in 1890. Britain had indicated already in the 1950s her intent to offer independence to Rhodesia, but had made clear in 1956 that she would not allow political groups that were racist to come to power. Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 was thus a brazen tweak of the nose at the British. As Smith rightly calculated, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson chose not to respond militarily. What Smith had not anticipated was that his "independent" Rhodesia would remain economically and politically at the mercy of the British. Wilson imposed selective economic sanctions, and, in 1966, the United Nations followed suit. By 1970 it was apparent that without the blessing of the British—and increasingly that meant the whole Commonwealth as well—Rhodesia was destined to become an isolated and economically handicapped pariah, all but surrounded by hostile African states.

27. Linden, *Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 208.

28. Ibid., 207.

29. Ibid., 209.

30. Ibid., 229.

31. Interview with McLaughlin.

32. Linden, *Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 210.

33. In March of that year, Muzorewa and Smith entered into the Internal Settlement, an arrangement that replaced Smith with a four-member Executive Council until elections. The council consisted of Smith and Muzorewa plus two other Rhodesia-based black leaders—Ndabaningi Sithole and Chief J. S. Chirau. The Internal Settlement provided for a Parliament to be established at elections to be held within a year, in which 28 seats were to be guaranteed for whites in a body of 100 members. The externally based Patriotic Front, which had not been consulted in this arrangement, immediately rejected this proposal for diluted majority rule, as did the United Nations and the Frontline States. Many parties, including the Catholic bishops, were initially ambivalent. The new leaders were installed, but it soon became apparent to outsiders that the three black "prime ministers" were mere puppets in a quartet controlled by Smith. By June 1978, the Catholic bishops and numerous

other groups had rejected the arrangement. Meanwhile, the war continued to escalate, often with Muzorewa at the forefront in castigating the Patriotic Front. On one occasion he appeared on television brandishing a machine gun, and on another he was quoted as saying that news of the Rhodesian Forces' bombing of Nkomo's forces in Lusaka was a great start to his day. Cf. ibid., 277.

34. Ibid., 264–65.

35. Interview with Mildred Neville, director of the Catholic Institute for International Relations throughout the war years, London, July 8, 1991.

36. The CIIR published "Comment #34," and the JPC published "An Analysis of the Salisbury Agreement." The Rhodesian bishops wavered on whether to support or reject the Internal Settlement and asked the JPC to withhold publication of the latter booklet in April 1978. But after two massacres had taken place, and it became apparent that the Internal Settlement would not end the war, the bishops supported the release of the booklet in July 1978 (interview with Michael Auret, secretary and primary staff person of the JPC from 1974 to present, Harare, May 28, 1991; also Linden, *Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 274).

37. The Catholic role in Rhodesia may well have been much different were it not for bishop Lamont, who led the way in establishing the JPC and in bringing often-reluctant fellow Bishops to a position of clear opposition to state policies. Lamont grew increasingly harsh in his criticism of the state and, after eventually denouncing it as "illegitimate," was finally deported to his native Ireland in February 1977.

38. Linden, *Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 166, fn.

39. Ibid., 213.

40. Ibid.; also interview with Auret. On the U.S. visit, the JPC was assisted by the Commission on Justice and Peace of the U.S. Catholic Conference of Bishops in opposing the Byrd Amendment, which would have allowed the United States to import strategic minerals from Rhodesia, in contravention of U.N. sanctions.

41. R. H. Randolph, *Dawn in Zimbabwe* (Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1985), 197-214.

42. Infuriated by an authorization by the minister of defense for his commanders to bomb villages harboring guerrillas, Lamont issued an open letter to the state charging it with being "racist," "oppressive," and not a legitimate government.

43. Randolph, *Dawn in Zimbabwe*, 220.

44. Linden, *Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 250.

45. This was done in a prepared speech delivered to both ZANU in Maputo and ZAPU in Lusaka by Archbishop Patrick Chakaipa (report on meetings with the Patriotic Front August 13-21, 1978, quoted in ibid., 278).

46. Interview with Auret. The JPC acted on Mugabe's request shortly after this meeting when guerrillas massacred 16 overseas Pentecostal missionaries, and, according to Auret, it felt satisfied with the ZANU response.

47. Ibid.

48. Linden, *Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 275–76.

49. The delegation consisted of Archbishop Patrick Chakaipa, JPC President Monsignor Helmut Reckter, S.J., JPC Secretary Michael Auret, Brother Fidelis Mukonori, Ishmael Muvingi, and Father Bernard Ndlovu.

50. One scholar, Carl Hallencreutz, identifies this meeting as a turning point in church-state relations in Zimbabwe and believes that it laid the groundwork for cooperative relations after the war ("A Council in Crossfire: ZCC 1964–1980," in *Church and State in Zimbabwe*, ed. Carl Hallencreutz and Ambrose Moyo [Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1988], 88).

51. Interview with Auret.

52. Linden, *Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 280.

53. Interview with Auret.

54. John Deary and Dieter Scholtz, as quoted in Linden, *Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 280.

55. In ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., 284.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Interview with Auret.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Bishop Lamont, now living in Ireland, met with ZANU and ZAPU leaders, urging them not to outlaw Christianity and not to conduct a Nuremburg-type trial. The Bethlehem Fathers met with the liberation fronts as well to discuss the closing by guerrillas of several schools they ran and to express concern about incidents of guerrilla misconduct. Numerous individuals from the liberation fronts came to CIIR and JPC for personal and logistical needs that arose in the course of the protracted negotiations (interview with McLaughlin; and interview with Neville).

64. Randolph, *Dawn in Zimbabwe*, 36.

65. Interview with McLaughlin.

66. Ibid.

67. In ibid.

68. Linden, *Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 270.

69. Sister Janice McLaughlin, October 1978, as reported in ibid.

70. In ibid.

71. However, the Jesuits sent a worker in a chaplaincy-oriented role to work in a ZANU refugee camp in Zambia in early 1979 (interview with Auret).

72. A small number of Catholics did, however, refuse to pay the 5 percent defense surtax to finance the war effort that Salisbury imposed toward the end of the war.

73. Randolph, *Dawn in Zimbabwe*, 220. Randolph gives no indication as to how many native Zimbabwean Catholic workers died in the war.

74. Linden, *Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 271.

75. *Daily News* of Tanzania, May 12, 1977, quoted in ibid., 252.

76. Interview on U.K. ITV Religious Programme, broadcast November 30, 1980, as quoted in Randolph, *Dawn in Zimbabwe*, 57–58.

77. Canaan Banana, "The Role of the Church in the Struggle for Liberation in Zimbabwe," in *Turmoil and Tenacity*, ed. Canaan Banana (Harare: College Press, 1989), 205.

78. Interview with Robertson.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. The events of the meeting were reconstructed from interviews with former Prime Minister Ian Smith, Harare, April 28, 1992; Emmerson Munangagwa, former head of intelligence and special advisor to Robert Mugabe, Harare, August 17, 1992; and Joram Kucherera, MRA worker, Kwe Kwe, Zimbabwe, August 18, 1992. All three were present at the meeting. Additional information came from interviews with MRA workers who

assisted in arranging the meeting: Alec Smith, Harare, May 27–28, 1991, and by telephone, September 6, 1992; Henry Macnicol, Edinburgh, June 9, 1991; and Robertson.

82. The representative was Machel's young special assistant on Frontline affairs, Fernando Homwano (interview with Kucherera).

83. Ibid.

84. There has been private speculation among some who were aware of the Mugabe-Smith meeting that the speech was a direct result of the encounter. It is possible that the meeting had an impact on the tone and nuances of the speech—Kucherera was present on Tuesday at Mugabe headquarters and witnessed the content being modified in a last-minute rehearsal between Mugabe and top aides in ways he believes to have been a consequence of the meeting (interview with Kucherera). But the evidence is overwhelming that Mugabe and others in the ZANU leadership had been working on unity as a theme of political leadership for months previously. To cite just a few examples: before Lancaster House, the Quakers had noted the topic being discussed by ZANU leaders in Maputo. At Lancaster House, Josiah Tongogara, by no means a moderate among ZANU leaders, spoke at length in an interview on October 29, 1979, about the need to include old enemies in a new government. Throughout his election campaign, Mugabe made clear his intent to create a society with room for everyone. (Cf. de Waal, *Politics of Reconciliation*, 40–47).

85. de Waal, *Politics of Reconciliation*, 49.

86. Although most MRA supporters are theistic, they do not insist on belief in God. They believe that anyone, including atheists, can receive guidance by merely undertaking the discipline of listening to the "inner voice."

87. Frank Buchman, *Remaking the World* (Washington, D.C.: Mackinac Press, n.d. [1948]), xxiv.

88. Interview with Robertson.

89. Interview with Alec Smith by Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, Falls Church, Va., September 23, 1990.

90. Peter Hannon, *South Africa: What Kind of Change?* (Johannesburg: Grosvenor Books, 1977), 13–18.

91. Henry Macnicol, personal communication dated October 30, 1992. Muzorewa later fell into disrepute within the liberation movement for opting to participate in compromise measures with the Rhodesia Front. But at this time he stood in high esteem as the formal representative of the liberation movement within Rhodesia.

92. Elliott, *Dawn in Zimbabwe*, 63.

93. Kanodereka was an enigmatic figure around whom controversy lingers. He was assassinated by unknown gunmen outside his home after initiating a promising peace effort in 1978 (see Quaker section for more information). Almost a decade later, Ken Flower, the man who for years directed Ian Smith's Central Intelligence Organization, asserted in his memoirs, *Serving Secretly* (Johannesburg: Galago Books, 1987), that Kanodereka was a paid agent of the organization. Flower, now dead, claimed that Kanodereka cooperated in a scheme that recruited many hundreds of young men into the guerrilla forces and then sent them into the bush in poison-doused trousers to die a slow death.

MRA workers dismiss this claim. Says Henry Macnicol, a key MRA worker who worked closely with Kanodereka: "I saw Kanodereka risk his life too many times for the cause of peace to believe such a claim from a man who made his living as a professional deceiver" (interview with Macnicol). Macnicol believes Flower's account is "an elaborate lie, told to discredit [Kanodereka's] life and influence by a man who hated and opposed everything Arthur stood for" (personal communication dated October 30, 1992). According to Alec Smith, the ZANU(PF) leadership went out of its way to provide financial

support to the family of Kanodereka in the early 1980s, and over this time Simon Muzenda, Tongogara, and Munangagwa all expressed in strong terms to him or other MRA workers their respect for Kanodereka (telephone interview with Alec Smith).

A verifiable verdict on Kanodereka may never be possible. What can be documented is that he risked his life repeatedly in an ambitious campaign for reconciliation and forgiveness, that he was eloquent and forceful in his many public and private presentations, and that he was unforgettable to all who met him.

94. At the core of the group were a handful of individuals deeply committed to the work of MRA: Alec Smith; Arthur Kanodereka; Ian Robertson; Henry Macnicol, a lifetime MRA worker from Edinburgh, Scotland, who lived in Rhodesia from 1974 to 1984; Steven Sibare, a young Rhodesian who joined MRA as a full-time staff person in 1979; Don Barnett, an accountant; Stan O'Donnell, former secretary of foreign affairs for nine years; Champion Chigwida, a trade unionist; Kevin Hongwe, a student; and Dixon Maremba, a school headmaster. Other sporadic attenders included Sir Cyril Hatty, a former government cabinet minister; Dr. Elliott Gabellah, a member of the Executive Committee of Muzorewa's ANC; Desmond Reader and Gordon Chavunduka, both academics at the University of Rhodesia; Hugh Elliott, a British MRA worker; and Andre Holland, a cabinet member.

95. Individuals in MRA developed friendships with members of ZANU and even more so with ZAPU, and secondary players from both organizations attended MRA conferences on occasion. But no leaders in the external liberation forces publicly identified themselves with MRA in the way that several leaders involved in the Internal Settlement did. Muzorewa, for example, was a close friend of the key MRA strategist Henry Macnicol and attended several MRA gatherings. Chief Chirau, one of Muzorewa's colleagues in the Internal Settlement, was the only politician among a small number of individuals signing a call for unity published by MRA just prior to the elections in 1980.

96. Transcript of presentation by Richard Ruffin, head of MRA activities in the United States, to the Religion and Conflict Resolution Project Steering Group, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., September 25, 1989.

97. Elliott, *Dawn in Zimbabwe*, 20; Peter Hannon, *Southern Africa: What Kind of Change?* (Johannesburg: Grosvenor Books, 1977), 36–37; and interview with Macnicol.

98. Transcript of Ruffin presentation.

99. Alec Smith, *Now I Call Him Brother* (London: Marshalls, 1984), 85.

100. Interview with Tom Glenn, Harare, April 29, 1992.

101. Interview with Macnicol.

102. Dates of this encounter unknown. Transcript of Ruffin presentation; confirmed in interview with Alec Smith.

103. Interview with Alec Smith.

104. Interview with Macnicol.

105. Interview with Robertson.

106. MRA's intentions are noble, but the reputation of the organization has been mixed due to the earnest agenda MRA workers have brought to their interaction with others. Particularly in South Africa, the author encountered as many people who harshly criticized MRA as a result of personal experience as those who appreciated the group. A common theme is that MRA relationship-building strategies in the 1960s and 1970s, the period when these individuals encountered MRA, were utilitarian and, in the eyes of some, manipulative. For example, one South African described with anger the way in which MRA workers got him to attend what he thought was a social function, but which turned out to be a high-powered call to personal morality. Another individual prominent in the Rhodesian political scene for several decades was scathing in his criticism of MRA visitation strategies: "I

could tell how popular I was from the amount of attention I was getting from MRA. When I was popular, they were interested. When I was not, I didn't hear from them." When they did visit, this politician found the meetings contrived: "They would do anything, absolutely anything, as a pretext to come and talk with me" (interview with Garfield Todd, former prime minister of Rhodesia, Harare, April 30, 1992).

107. The elder Smith claims not to have been aware of any particular moral concerns from his son, nor even of the fact that Kanodereka and other MRA visitors whom Alec took to meet him were affiliated with MRA (interview with Ian Smith).

108. Muzorewa did in fact later yield to this temptation. By the end of the war he had an "auxiliary force" of about 26,000 loyal to his party, the UANC ("The 1980 Rhodesian Election: A Report" [London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1980], 10).

109. Interview with Macnicol.

110. Ibid. History again shows that Muzorewa failed to heed the advice of his MRA friends. He conducted an acrimonious, highly personalized election campaign that played heavily on stereotypical fears of Mugabe et al.

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid.

113. Ibid.

114. Interview with Alec Smith by Johnston and Sampson.

115. Interview with Macnicol.

116. Interview with Alec Smith by Johnston and Sampson.

117. Interview with Robertson, Harare, May 1, 1992.

118. Interview with Alec Smith.

119. Transcript of Ruffin presentation.

120. Ibid.

121. Ibid.; also interview with Robertson.

122. One MRA worker estimated that there were three or four showings a week at the MRA house in Salisbury over this time, for groups ranging from two to 20 in size (interview with Robertson).

123. Ibid.; also interview with Alec Smith, Harare, May 1, 1992.

124. Telephone interview with Alec Smith.

125. Ibid.

126. Confidential Quaker report, Quaker Peace and Service, William Penn House, London, 1981.

127. Interview with Jepson.

128. Ibid.

129. "Quaker Experience of Political Mediation," a document resulting from a Quaker consultation, Buckhamshire, England, August 21–24, 1989.

130. Ibid.

131. Interview with Adam Curle, London, July 10, 1991.

132. Interview with Tim Hawkins, Harare, August 17, 1992.

133. The Quakers took up the issue with Mugabe's aides in a later meeting to no immediate avail. But some months later, four abductees were released and the Quakers' contacts in the Salisbury Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote and thanked them for their contribution to the release, "brought about by the water-dripping-on-a-stone technique of pressing the matter at every opportunity" (the confidential Quaker report cites an undated letter from Tim Hawkins).

134. Confidential Quaker report.

135. Interview with Jepson.

136. Ibid.

137. Although Muzorewa had begun his role in politics as a respected leader of the internal nationalist party, the African Nationalist Congress (ANC), by June 1979, when Nyerere made this overture, Muzorewa was a part of the Internal Settlement government and stood in the ironic role of supporting a war against his old comrades, a task he undertook with all the bombast and rhetoric of his predecessor, Smith.

138. Confidential Quaker report.

139. British Prime Minister James Callaghan sent Cledwyn Hughes on a high-profile mission in November–December 1978 to explore the possibility of all-party talks, an eventuality that would have rendered moot a meeting with Mugabe. After the initiative had dominated the scene for nearly three months, Callaghan announced that the time was not yet ripe for a conference.

140. *Indaba* is a term used widely in southern Africa meaning "palaver." Kanodereka and Byron Hove, a Salisbury lawyer, had recently left Muzorewa's ANC; the third person was Max Chigwida. Kanodereka, of course, was a central figure in MRA from 1975 until his death, and Chigwida, to a lesser extent, was also involved in MRA.

141. Confidential Quaker report.

142. The events included the April 1979 election in Rhodesia; the Quaker-facilitated round of communication between Muzorewa, Nyerere, ZANU, and ZAPU; and, ultimately, the Lusaka Accord, which turned the attention of the parties toward Lancaster House.

143. Of the six requests for meetings, this is the only one that the Quakers knew for certain had taken place (confidential Quaker report).

144. The external liberation fronts were adamant that the British be at the table since, in their view, Rhodesia had yet to become genuinely independent from British rule.

145. Confidential Quaker report.

146. "Quaker Experience of Political Mediation."

147. Although they sought to do this without bias, much of their attention was directed toward helping the Salisbury delegation and the British government understand the position of the Patriotic Front (PF). By all accounts, Carrington played a highly assertive role in mediating the talks. He frequently undertook a strategy of first testing proposals on the Salisbury delegation, and after getting their approval, putting them to the Patriotic Front. On several occasions, when the PF balked, he threatened to go ahead with the proposals anyway and simply work out a bilateral settlement between the British and the Rhodesian governments. A reluctant partner to the talks in the first place, the PF reacted with increasing negativity to these dynamics of the negotiation process. Concerned about the possibility of the whole exercise breaking down, the Quakers sought to reduce the possibility of a walkout by trying to create better understanding, particularly among the British, of PF concerns.

148. "Quaker Experience of Political Mediation."

149. Confidential Quaker report.

150. Ibid.

151. Ibid.

152. Ibid. Throughout this period, the Quakers interacted frequently with the British Council of Churches and thus were able to amplify the impact of their own efforts.

153. Ibid.

154. Ibid.

155. Ibid.

156. Ibid.

157. Nathan Shamuyarira, minister of information and tourism, and Didymus Mutasa, member of the ZANU Executive Committee and later elected speaker of the House of Assembly, made these comments in private meetings with Tony Gilpin (confidential Quaker report).

158. Emeka Anyaoku, then deputy secretary-general of the Commonwealth Secretariat, speaking with Tony Gilpin in March 1980. Anyaoku, of course, was not a party to the conflict but had been at both Lusaka and Lancaster House and was intimately acquainted with the perceptions of all parties (confidential Quaker report).

159. Confidential Quaker report.

160. Ibid.

161. Interview with Curle.

162. Adam Curle, *Tools for Transformation* (Stroud, U. K.: Hawthorn Press, 1990), 85. The comment was made by an American diplomat attached to the United Nations throughout the war to Curle, whom the speaker had no idea was himself a Quaker.

163. Letter from Joan Wicken to Walter Martin, March 27, 1980, as quoted in confidential Quaker report. Wicken had been deeply involved in arranging all of the Quaker meetings with Nyerere.

164. Robert Theobald, *The Rapids of Social Change: Social Entrepreneurship in Turbulent Times* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Knowledge Systems, 1987), 141.

165. Many Americans are oblivious to—and readers from elsewhere may be unaware of—the fact that the American penny is inscribed with the motto "In God We Trust."

166. See Hallencreutz, "Council in Crossfire," 51–101.

167. Interview with Kuchera.

168. Ibid.

169. Hallencreutz, "Council in Crossfire," 98. Presumably this is a quote from council documents.

170. Interview with Kuchera.

171. Right up until the 1980 elections, Nkomo apparently entertained notions of singlehandedly dominating the political future of the country. Cf. Flower, *Serving Secretly*, 264, 268.

172. The Patriotic Front leaders were ambivalent about the churches. On the one hand, their resentment toward Bishop Muzorewa, whom they regarded as a traitor, made them suspicious of churches in general and in particular of members of the delegation thought to favor him. On the other hand, recent grants from the World Council of Churches to the liberation movements had helped restore their faith in the churches, and, additionally, the movements sought the support of the influential council (interview with Kuchera).

173. Quoted by Kuchera during interview.

174. Hallencreutz, "Council in Crossfire," 99, cites a report to this effect by Bishop Shiri, a member of the committee.

175. Interview with Ian Smith.

176. The "ripeness" school of negotiations theory holds that settlement has relatively little to do with the skills and attitudes of the negotiators, and rather is a function of the balance of inputs of internal and external actors involved in the conflict system at any time. When the key parties all decide in a given moment that now is the time most favorable to their own interests to settle, the conflict is "ripe" and settlement becomes likely. So notes Mottie Tamarkin in a thought-provoking paper, "Negotiations or Conflict Resolution in South Africa: Lessons from Zimbabwe" (published in conference proceedings, *Conflicts and Negotiations* [Munich: Herbert Quandt Foundation, 1992], 15–22). Tamarkin draws on Richard Haas's elaboration of ripeness theory to analyze the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe negotiations. Although this author finds Tamarkin's analysis overly Machiavellian, according to it one could reasonably conclude that the religious actors were several of numerous important influences bringing the situation to a point of "ripeness." To take one instance, Tamarkin believes Margaret Thatcher's about-face in rejecting the Internal Settlement was the key to this conflict becoming "ripe." It is likely that both the Catholics and Quakers contributed to what some called "the education of Maggie Thatcher": the Catholics through their protracted lobbying efforts, and the Quakers through their quiet conversations with British politicians and FCO officials who were part of the complex web of influence at work on Thatcher. Legum (*Battlefronts of Southern Africa*) highlights the influence of the Australians and Mozambicans in Thatcher's change of heart. MRA workers believe that they were influential in tipping Malcolm Fraser, then Australian prime minister, toward challenging Thatcher (interview with MRA worker and senior official in Fraser's administration, Allan Griffith, Washington, D.C., July 19, 1991).